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Holistic Interpretation, Comparative
Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms
VICKI C. JACKSON*

Owen Fiss is clearly one of our generation's most important scholars in constitutional law. My own scholarly work has been influenced
by my having been his student at Yale Law School, and I want to begin
by acknowledging my enormous intellectual debt to him. This Essay
will consider the integration of older and newer constitutional commitments in the context of three central concerns in Owen Fiss's work for racial equality, for freedom of expression, and for the distinctive role
of courts in the constitutional system.
This Essay urges an approach to constitutional interpretation that is
more holistic in taking account of constitutional change, giving greater
weight to more recent amendments in construing the entire Constitution.
The equality values embodied in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
should not be treated as constitutional latecomers, but as fundamental to
our constitutional commitments in the same way that First Amendment
freedom of expression values are. In understanding how to interpret a
constitution that accords priority both to equality and to freedom of
expression, I suggest comparative constitutional law can be helpful,
because most Western liberal democracies have written constitutions
that made commitments simultaneously to freedom of expression and
equality values. The constitutional case law in other Western democracies can illuminate interpretive approaches grounded in simultaneous
commitments to freedom of expression and human equality.
Often a source of civic pride, the age of the U.S. Constitution is
also a source of great challenge both for workable governance and
aspirational constitutionalism in the United States. With its basic power
distributing structures established in 1789 and with an unusually difficult amending process, this is a constitution that must be subject to
enough flexibility in interpretation in order to do the basic work of a
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. With thanks for helpful
comments and conversations to Alex Aleinikoff, Dennis Curtis, Neal Katyal, Nina Pillard, Bob
Pitofsky, Judith Resnik, Roy Schotland, Mike Seidman, Bob Taylor, Mark Tushnet, and to
participants in the University of Miami Law Review's conference in honor of Owen Fiss and to
participants in the Georgetown University Law Center Summer Research Workshop. This Essay
was written for a conference in honor of Owen Fiss in March 2003, before the Court's decisions in
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), and
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). Although references to these cases have been added,
the Essay's basic critique and argument were written prior to these decisions.
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national constitution - that is, to provide a good framework for governance (that is both effective and protective of human rights) and to
express fundamental national commitments and self-understandings.'
Our practice of adding amendments to the constitutional text in the
chronological order in which they are enacted, rather than as integrated
with the text, is a graphic reminder of the challenge faced by those
charged with the regular articulation of the Constitution's meaning to
interpret all of its provisions in light of what it, and we as a polity, have
become.2
In earlier work, I have suggested how the great gaps in the timing
of adoption of the 1787 Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and more recent
amendments should inform constitutional interpretation. 3 It is conven-

tional for U.S. courts to begin analysis of constitutional questions either
with a particular clause and its associated case law, 4 or with the eighteenth century founding text,' and move forward in time to see how
founding decisions have either endured or been changed. My suggestion

is that in resolving interpretive questions we try instead (or rather, in
addition) to begin with the more recent amendments and what they stand
1. See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 633, 637-40
(1991) (discussing rights protection and effective governance as among the purposes of
entrenched constitutions); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1270-74 (1999) (discussing expressivism in comparative constitutional law).
I am putting to one side for the present a number of other purposes for which constitutions may be
adopted, e.g., solving various collective action problems, see Sunstein, supra, at 640-41, or
declaring and establishing a nation's sovereignty, see H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions
Without Constitutionalism:Reflections on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTrrrrIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,
1993).
2. See generally Ed Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution:or What if Madison had
Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1998).
3. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated
Constitution,53 STAN. L. REv. 1259 (2001). In developing this approach, I owe much to the work
of Bruce Ackerman, Ahkil Amar and Charles Black. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court,
1999 Term - Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 30 (2000)
[hereinafter Amar, Foreword];Akhil Reed Amar, Intratexualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 800-01
(1999) [hereinafter Amar, Intrasexualism]. For other very helpful work in related veins, see
Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,88 VA. L. REv. 951 (2002); Reva Siegel, She
the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism and the Family, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 947 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-49, 852-53, 855-59 (1992)
(anchoring analysis in the Court's decisions in Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
5. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 906-07, 911-13, 918-33 (1997) (relying
primarily on the Court's prior jurisprudence); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-59,
160-62, 167-68, 174-77 (1992) (anchoring analysis in Court's jurisprudence and original
understandings of the Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause).
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for and read these more contemporaneous constitutional commitments
back into the older portions. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,6 which holds that
Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states
when it acts under the Fourteenth Amendment, was based on a form of
this holistic reasoning in which later enacted parts of the Constitution
are a lens through which earlier parts should be interpreted. My argument is for inclusion of this "reverse chronological" method of holistic
reasoning, in addition to methodologies in constitutional interpretation
that assume the priority of earlier enacted provisions, in the canon of
interpretive approaches.
Treating the more recent amendments as interpretive lenses for the
older parts is justified by a meta-constitutional value of democracy. We
have an old and very difficult to amend written constitution. As among
reasonably arguable interpretations, we should choose those most consistent with how the weight of the Constitution has changed as popular
commitments have shifted and been expressed in more recent amendments - at least absent a compelling other reason. 7 So, just as the Court
in Fitzpatrick read the Eleventh Amendment in light of the Fourteenth,
the Court should read the powers granted to Congress in Article I in
light of the post-Civil War commitment, expressed not only in the Fourteenth Amendment but several others, to the values of human equality
and national citizenship. In Part I of this Essay, I discuss the possibility
of re-reading the First Amendment through the lens of the Fourteenth
and its progeny.
In Part II, I explore the possible benefit of comparative constitutional law in illuminating the question of holistic interpretation of First
Amendment freedoms and equality rights - that is, how would we
understand our older constitutional commitments if we were to re-understand them in light of our newer commitments? A number of Western
democracies have constitutional case law interpreting constitutions that,
from the outset, included commitments to rights and freedoms that, in
the United States, became parts of our constitutional commitments at
6. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
7. Compelling reasons might be found where constitutional amendments compel or
authorize action inconsistent with very basic human rights and human dignity. As Walter Murphy
has argued, the strongest moral arguments for democracy flow from the same commitment to
equal human dignity that supports constitutional protection for human rights. See Walter Murphy,
Consent and ConstitutionalChange, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTrrtrnONAL LAW 123, 141-45
(James O'Reilly ed., 1992). Such commitments to human dignity, in turn, support constitutional
limitations on democratic action that offends human dignity. Were there to be constitutional
amendments authorizing or requiring action inconsistent with human dignity, commitments to
democracy understood as an elaboration of human dignity suggest that the appropriate role of the
courts would be to read those more narrowly, notwithstanding their more recent and procedurally
democratic vintage.
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very different times. Because Canada and Germany, for example, have
always had to interpret their Charter of Rights and Basic Law, respectively, in light of their commitments both to freedom of expression and
to equality of persons, their approaches may illuminate possibilities for
harmonization of these constitutional values for the United States and
based on the U.S. Constitution, understood holistically. Without denying important historic and institutional differences that exist among
these three countries (differences that may well bear on what is a workable and legitimate interpretive choice within the U.S. constitutional tradition), the approaches of these other Western democracies illuminate a
range of apparently reasonable choices that belie some of the certitudes
of the U.S. Court's current jurisprudence. They offer alternative
approaches to reconciling commitments to equality and freedom of
expression that we might think of as one mirror for viewing the U.S.
Constitution in light of all of its constitutional commitments. And in so
doing they offer something of a response to Owen Fiss's efforts to
resolve knotty questions about hate speech or campaign finance within
the First Amendment in order to avoid pitting equality against liberty.8
Re-understanding the U.S. Constitution along the lines I suggest
will not readily resolve these or other genuinely hard issues, as I try to
indicate briefly in Part III of this Essay. The question of holistic interpretation focuses on the role of constitutional courts and constitutional
law, which, I argue, is not simply to translate original intentions into
contemporary settings, but to reflect how the weight of constitutional
"intentions" must themselves be re-understood in light of constitutional
change. I advance this argument here in the context of two issues hate speech and campaign finance regulation - that implicate competing and important constitutional values. Each is currently conceived of
as governed by First Amendment freedom of expression norms. Each
also implicates constitutional values of equal citizenship and equality of
persons. Both present an occasion to explore further the possibilities of
re-understanding the U.S. Constitution so as enable it to continue to
function well as a framework for governance and a charter of rights for
the twenty-first century. What holistic interpretation, informed by comparative constitutional practice, may contribute to these discussions is a
willingness to acknowledge both equality values and freedom of expression values in constitutional problems that, candidly understood, involve
both. A third issue, the constitutionality of public regulation of candidate speech in judicial elections, will be discussed briefly, for what it
8. See OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996) [hereinafter Fiss,
M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
(1996) [hereinafter Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED].

IRONY]; OWEN
STATE POWER
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suggests about the Court's understanding of the judicial role and the
need for judicial independence and its relationship to the First

Amendment.
I.

HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION

A central challenge for constitutional interpretation is change change in human realities and change in the constitutional text itself.
Owen Fiss has written with insight on the importance of the paradigms
around which constitutional theory is often constructed.' He notes the
paradigm that informed Professor Kalven's view of the First Amendment - the street corner speaker - and has argued that the paradigm
must be refocused on how to sustain the freedom of speech in a world
where street corners play a less significant role in important discourse.' 0
The process of constitutional change through amendments itself informs
constitutional interpretation, in part because that process carries with it
or is interwoven with shifts in the factual paradigms that most concern
us in the polity." Our Constitution's initial concern with protecting
9. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1405-13
(1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure]; Owen M. Fiss, In Search of a New
Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613 (1995) [hereinafter Fiss, New Paradigm]. For interesting
discussion of constitutional paradigms, see Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken,
104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1169-71 (1995).
10. See Fiss, LIERALisM DIVIED, supra note 8, at 8, 13-14, 49-55; see also Fiss, New
Paradigm,supra note 9 at 1614-15; Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 9 at 140824 (discussing Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
11. For a skeptical view about the role of constitutional amendments, see David Strauss, The
Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). I think Strauss goes
too far in suggesting that constitutional amendments are irrelevant to the development of the small
"c" "constitution," but I agree with his claim that constitutional amendments are only one part of
an evolutionary process of constitutional change that includes not only constitutional amendments
and judicial decisions but also shifts in understandings reflected in statutory, regulatory or
common law developments at the federal and state levels. Although it may be correct as a matter
of political judgment that methods other than constitutional amendment will be more effective in
securing a desired change, this does not imply that constitutional text, in the form of later
amendments, is not entitled to particular weight in argument over what constitutional law is.
Constitutional text performs two distinctive functions that Professor Strauss acknowledges: It
eliminates the legitimacy of outliers once a moderate degree of consensus has formed, and it
settles issues that need resolution. In addition, constitutional text performs a third function in that
it provides a textual framework for legal argument. While it is true, as Professor Strauss suggests,
that a particular text may be subject to very different interpretations that may change over time in
response to events and phenomena unconnected with the amendment, yet the presence of, for
example, an equal protection clause defines a legitimate arena for legal dispute and argument. Cf.
Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of ConstitutionalAmendments: A Response to
David Strauss, 77 TuL. L. REV. 247, 271 (2002) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments,
"under-enforced though they were, were not totally without effect"). Finally, I am concerned in
this Essay not so much with the complex set of historical forces that have propelled changes in
constitutional text and constitutional interpretations on issues of both First Amendment and
equality law in the twentieth century, but with articulating a normative understanding of the role
of constitutional amendments insofar as the constitutional text matters.
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human liberty from improper restraint or coercion and the home and
other property from unreasonable or uncompensated disturbances was
supplemented by constitutional commitments to equality of citizenship,
the centrality of voting and the rights of persons to the "equal protection
of the laws." The assumption of white, propertied males as paradigmatic citizen-voters was rejected in a series of amendments.
Constitutional amendments provide legitimate occasions for interpretative change. 12 It is obvious to say that when the Constitution's text
changes, the courts must apply the new text as written. How we come to
understand and to construct what an amendment means is a complex
question embracing virtually the entire range of views on constitutional
interpretation. Evidence of original understandings, the text itself,
precedents and historical practices all play a role, as does the fact that
the authoritative text is amended at different times and by different generations, each bringing its own multiple and complex set of understandings of what the existing text means and what the amendment is to
accomplish. It is the task of constitutional interpretation to integrate
those many understandings or "constitutions" of the Constitution into a
workable whole. 3
In reading the Constitution holistically, I argue, some newer constitutional texts should be understood as "changing" the whole Constitution - as infusing the interpretive project more generally - rather than
merely adding, or subtracting, some discrete portion of what came
before it. 4 In the original Constitution of 1789, equality of persons was
at best a subordinate theme. Indeed, it could be argued that the original
Constitution was wholly antithetical to equality - in its reliance on
electoral processes excluding persons of African descent, and women,
from political rights of participation and voting, and in its active protection of slavery for at least one generation after the founding. Not only
12. I do not claim that it is only by constitutional amendment that constitutional interpretation
changes or should change, but rather that new constitutional texts provide the occasion for revised
interpretations of constitutional law.
13. My emphasis on workability is framed by an understanding that the Constitution should
be construed to facilitate effective governance consistent with principles of equal citizenship,
representative democracy, law as the basis of legitimate government power, separation of powers,
federalism and the protection of individual rights. These principles may pull in different
directions in different cases and thus workability is at times in tension with simple models of
coherence. For helpful discussions of the need for more complex models of interpretation, see,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Rule of Law" As A Concept
in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
14. In this sense my inquiry has much in common with and has been informed by the work of
Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 3; Amar, Foreword, supra
note 3; Amar, Intratexualism, supra note 3. For my earlier acknowledgment of the intellectual
debt I owe them, see Jackson, supra note 3, at 1267 n.35.
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did the original Constitution protect slavery, it also treated slaves as formally less than a whole person in establishing the rules for counting
population for purposes of allocating representatives to the states in the

House of Representatives. 15 Its provisions for the Senate suggest that
the equality of concern to that generation was an equality of states,
rather than persons. And not only was each state afforded two senators,
but this provision was made essentially unamendable. Equality of states,
of political communities, was thus of comparable -or perhaps even

greater - importance, than principles of individual political equality.
Political equality of citizens, such as existed importantly in the original
Constitution, was reserved in practice (and, for the most part, in state
law) only for white men.
Yet the original Constitution carried within it the seeds of a commitment to human equality,16 albeit as a subordinate rather than dominant theme. Egalitarian principles among the body recognized as
citizens were immanent, first, in the composition of the House of Representatives. Determining membership by the population of the states is a
proposition - however infested with the racism of the three-fifths rule
- that can be seen as the beginning of the idea that voting power should
be related to numbers of persons represented,' 7 an idea that comes to full
15. And in so doing, the three-fifths rule not only denied the humanity of slaves but also
allocated voting power disproportionately to whites in slave states.
16. For different perspectives on the Constitution's original commitment to equality, see, e.g.,
GARY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONsTIrruTONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 3-4
(1993) (treating the original Constitution as the "silver frame" around the nation's "golden apple"
aspirations toward equality ("liberty for all") designed, as Lincoln saw it, to preserve that
commitment and allow advances toward equality for all); GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG:
THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 38-39 (1992) (arguing that Lincoln used the Gettysburg
Address to substitute for the older Constitution, which lacked commitment to equality, his own
new creation); Stephen M. Griffin, The Age of Marbury: Judicial Review in a Democracy of
Rights, 44-46, 49-50 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, paper presented at Georgetown University
Law Center's Commemoration of the Anniversary of Marbury v. Madison) (arguing that the
original Constitution was not committed to political equality and that commitment to political
equality evolved through African-American struggles in the twentieth century).
17. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) ("construed in its historical context, the
command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much
as another's"); see also id. at 11-13 (noting Convention rejection of proposal to limit
representatives from future Western states); id. at 14 ("[iut would defeat the principle solemnly
embodied in the Great Compromise - equal representation in the House for equal numbers of
people - for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional
districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than
others. The House of Representatives, the Convention agreed, was to represent the people as
individuals, and on a basis of complete equality for each voter."); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725 (1983) (congressional districts must be mathematically equal in size "as nearly as is
practicable" and thus state districting plan with less than one-percent variances held
unconstitutional). But cf United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992)
(holding that Congress has more latitude in choosing methods to allocate representatives to the
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fruition only in the one person-one vote cases of the 1960s. In addition,
the decision in the 1787 Constitution to include relatively minimal qualifications for federal office may be seen as a manifestation of what, in the
contemporary moment of the eighteenth century, was egalitarian open-

ness to "merit," regardless of birth, property or background (again,
though, within constrained racist and sexist norms of who was entitled
to be understood as a full member of the polity). The ban on titles of
nobility reinforced the sense that this constitution was, relative to other
political systems in the minds of the framers, more open to the idea of
human equality.1 8 The Constitution's commitment to regular popular
elections (not for all members of Congress but at least for members of
the House of Representatives) 9 is unmistakable.
Deepening commitments to a basic norm of equality of citizenship
and to the foundational character of popular election comes later - in
Amendments Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Seventeen, Nineteen, TwentyThree, Twenty-Four, and Twenty-six." ° Slavery is abolished, a national
citizenship based on birth in the United States is defined, states are prohibited from denying to persons the equal protection of laws, racial disstates and is not bound by the "as nearly as is practicable" mathematical equality principle in light
of other constitutional constraints, including that each state have one representative). Note that
the Court in Wesberry says that this result is required by Article I, section 2. 376 U.S. at 7-9.
Justice Stevens, in concurrence in Karcher, says that the rule is not required by Article I, but by
the post Civil War amendments. 462 U.S. at 745-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
18. See GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232-33, 238-39
(1991) (revolution set in motion tremendous change in norms of social equality); GORDON WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787, 606-15 (1969) (describing republican

values of the Revolutionary period and their influence on the drafting of the Constitution).
19. Note also the Constitution's evident assumption in Article I, section 2 that state legislators
would be chosen by elections (federal voter requirements to be the same as for voting for the most
numerous branch of state legislatures), and its ambiguous but strong commitment that the United
States "guarantee" to each state a "republican form of government" in Article IV.
20. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DImTRUST 7 (1980). See also U.S. CONST. amend.
XXII (generally limiting presidents to two terms in office). Arguably the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment belongs on this list as well. It invokes an intervening election as a procedural device
to forestall unduly self-interested behavior by elected representatives. See generally Adrian
Vermeule, The ConstitutionalLaw of Official Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 501 (2002)
(treating the Twenty-Seventh Amendment as a "veil of ignorance" rule designed to mitigate selfdealing in congressional compensation by introducing uncertainty as to the effect of a vote in
favor of higher compensation on being re-elected and hence on who would benefit from the higher
pay). Note that although an election is the checking device insisted on, it is not elections
simpliciter, but an intervening election. The theory of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is that the
was not sufficient to prevent selfwithout additional regulation political process aggrandizing financial behavior by incumbents. Its ratification as part of the Constitution after
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), was decided, then, arguably might bear on constitutional
arguments for greater regulation of the financing of election campaigns. I do not explore this
possibility here, however, in part because the interpretive complications surrounding the TwentySeventh Amendment's unusual, and long, process of enactment would require much further
analysis. See Denning & Vile, supra note 11, at 279 n. 129 (standing by itself, this very specific
and concrete amendment may have little weight with respect to other parts of the Constitution).
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crimination in voting is outlawed, the Senate is required to be chosen by
popular election, gender discrimination in voting is outlawed (though
only after being implicitly endorsed in section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), representation for citizens in the District of Columbia is
provided, and poll taxes that effectively discriminate in voting based on
wealth are prohibited. In addition to standing for principles of equality
of all citizens, this course of reinforcing amendments surrounding political equality with respect to voting reflects the Constitution's increased
presumption in favor of democratic representative decision-making by which I mean, minimally, decision-making in which each adult citizen has the opportunity regularly to vote in contested elections for members of the representative bodies of government and to have his or her
vote counted equally with that of other electors. 21

Though not the only important and new constitutional commitments, these two - equality of citizenship and the foundational character of popular elections of representatives - have gained weight and

gravity in the U.S. constitutional system over time. Although members
of the Court have themselves disputed whether the equal representation
principle in the House of Representatives derives from Article I or rather
from the Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no dispute that the development of constitutional law on congressional districts followed decisions deriving a one-person, one-vote rule from the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 2 The significance of these

developments

for constitutional interpretation

more generally is

reflected in the Court's breathtaking relegation of the "equal suffrage"
21. Cf Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1326 (1994) (democracy and majoritarianism as rule by simple majorities with each voter having
one vote); Philippe Van Parijs, Justice and Democracy: Are they Incompatible, 4 J. POL. PHIL.
101, 102 (1996) (defining democracy "as the combination of majority rule; universal suffrage; and
free voting."). There is, of course, an enormous literature and disagreement about what voting
methods best accord with this principle of the equal value of each voter, including whether
democratic voting should enable different weights to be accorded to different intensities of
preferences held by voters on issues or candidates. I am not yet persuaded that the Constitution
provides any clear basis on which to choose among these systems so long as each is honestly
aimed at a process in which each voter's expressed preference for a candidate is given equal value
in the weighing or counting process. The Constitution imposes some clear constraints on the full
operation of even this limited principle at the national level, for example, in requiring that each
state have at least one representative and two senators.
22. Compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1964) (holding that rule of equal size for
congressional districts derives from provisions of Article I, section 2) with Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 745-50 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that equality principle for
congressional districts derives from Fourteenth Amendment and not from Article I). For earlier
articulation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the one-person, one-vote rule, see Gray v.
Saunders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); see also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 570 (1946)
(Black, J., dissenting) (Fourteenth Amendment reinforces understanding that Article I, section 2
requires approximately equal population in congressional districts).
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provisions for the U.S. Senate from a principle of American federalism
to a "compromise" standing for no more generalizable principle. 23 Individual equality, at least in the political sphere of voting and elections,
had moved from a subordinate to a dominant norm.24
In important respects these constitutional changes have been very

much reflected in vast parts of Court's jurisprudence. An enormous
jurisprudence of equal protection has grown up protecting not only voting rights but also, in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education,5 rights
to be treated with fairness and equality in a wide range of governmental
settings. Most of the cases in which these developments have advanced,
however, have entailed the assertion of claims of individual right
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment and asserted against "state"
interests, which are understood against a matrix that runs from permissible through compelling, but are not commonly understood as themselves
implementing the Constitution.

In some areas, however, such as the scope of congressional power
under Article I of the Constitution or, my subject here, the scope of the
First Amendment (as opposed to the level of government to which it
applies), it has not been conventional to read the newer parts of the Constitution as infusing our understanding of what came before.26 Akhil
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574 (1964) (rejecting the argument that states may
maintain one part of a bicameral legislature apportioned on a basis other than population and
indicating that the U.S. Senate was "conceived out of compromise and concession" and thus is not
a more generalizable principle of governance); see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly,
377 U.S. 713, 738 (1964).
24. The "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights' guarantees against the states, in criminal
procedure and with respect to the speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment, might be
understood in part as an extension of the model of national citizenship to the states and in part as
motivated by a desire to distinguish the United States from the abuses of fascist and Nazi regimes
in Europe and elsewhere. See Michael Klarman, Rethinking The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 43-44, 54-55, 57-58, 63-67 (1996) (citing Francis A. Allen, The
Supreme Court, Federalism,and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. Rv. 213, 219
(1959) for suggesting that Powell v. Alabama may have been in part a response to the rise of
Hitler in Germany, and DAVID BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 101 (1992), for suggesting that the criminal procedure revolution was in part a response
to police states in Europe and Asia). Unlike the extension of equal protection analysis to the
federal government described in the text below, the incorporation debate revolved around a "new"
text, the Fourteenth Amendment, even though its new meaning was not elucidated until many
years after its enactment.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown was decided in 1954, more than 80 years after ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously did not "cause"
the Court's holding in Brown, but it did provide a textual occasion and normative basis for that
decision. For discussion of the some of the international factors motivating government support
for the Court's outcome, see Mary Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis & Foreign Affairs: Race,
Resistance and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997); Mary
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
26. There are counterexamples, that is, cases in which the Court expressly indicates that the
meaning of earlier portions of the Constitution has changed or been affected by later enactments.
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Amar's important work has drawn attention to the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment not only on the application of aspects of the Bill of
Rights to the states but on shifting understandings of what those earlier
constitutional texts stand for. 27 And a case can surely be made that the
Court itself has read newer parts of the Constitution as affecting understandings of earlier parts, both with respect to racial segregation and the
law of elections.
The parallels between the Court's extension of the principle of
Brown to the federal government in Boiling v. Sharpe,28 on the one
hand, and its extension of the principles of Baker v. Carr29 to Wesberry
v. Sanders,3 ° on the other, are noteworthy examples. In Boiling, the

Court was explicit in tying its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment, having been
enacted after the Eleventh Amendment, empowers Congress to overcome state's constitutional
immunity from suit when enforcing Fourteenth Amendment provisions); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (relying on enactment of Nineteenth Amendment to conclude that
protective legislation for women employees was not constitutional); The Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding the draft against federalism claims and asserting that any
doubt as to the scope of Congress' powers to raise armies through conscription was removed by
the Fourteenth Amendment's establishment of national citizenship with correlative rights and
duties); infra, text accompanying notes 28-33. Fourteenth Amendment equality interests have
also been recognized as, in a sense, supporting "compelling state interests" in preventing
discrimination in privately owned but public places of accommodation. See Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (rejecting First Amendment associational claim by Jaycees to
exclude women from citizenship in light of states' important interest in assuring equality of access
to public accommodations); but cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding
application of state law banning sexual orientation discrimination by private associations
unconstitutional where group was an "expressive association").
27. See Arafr REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RiGHTs: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 236-37
(1998) (asserting that in the eighteenth century, the paradigmatic speaker protected by the First
Amendment was a popular publisher, while in the mid-nineteenth century the paradigmatic
speaker became the popularly spumed abolitionist speaker, and arguing that this shift was
reflected in a "new First-Fourteenth Amendment tradition that is less majoritarian and more
libertarian"). See generally id. at 137-294 (discussing effect of Reconstruction on Bill of Rights).
28. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
29. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
30. 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (concluding that the reference in Article I, section 2 to election of
members of the House of Representatives by "the people" implied that if members are selected in
districts, the districts must be of the same population in order to assure that "[a]s nearly as
practicable ... one man's vote is worth as much as another's"). Wesberry was argued after, but
decided before, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that both houses of state legislatures be apportioned
in accordance with the one-person, one-vote rule. That rule was presaged by Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 377 (1963) (holding that use of county unit system in vote for statewide office violated
the Equal Protection Clause); see also infra, note 32; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 570
(1946) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that challenge to congressional districting should not have
been dismissed as nonjusticiable and concluding that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
reinforced an understanding of Article I, section 2 that congressional districts should contain
"approximately equal populations").
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obligations of the federal government to the anti-discrimination obligations that the Fourteenth Amendment set for the states: The Court wrote:
"[W]e have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools.... In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would
'3 1
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government."
And in the reapportionment cases, Wesberry's interpretation of Article I,
section 2 as requiring that congressional districts within states follow the
one-person one-vote rule, followed the Court's earlier consideration of a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to districting in elections for statewide
office, in which the Court rejected analogies to the Electoral College
(and its incorporation of the per-unit representation rule for states in the
Senate) as based on a "conception of political equality [that] belongs to a
bygone day" in light of the enactment of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments.3 2 In both sets of cases, a principle of equality
law, apparently derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, is applied to
the states and state office; the same principle is also extended to the
federal government and congressional office, as interpretations of older,
pre-existing parts of the Constitution.33
31. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 498, 500; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (asserting that all laws curtailing the civil rights of a single racial group are constitutionally
suspect but upholding such a law directed against Japanese Americans). Note the Court's
extension of the constraints on state action in ameliorative programs (see City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)) to the federal government, notwithstanding section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). With no change

in the constitutional text understood as constraining the federal government (that is, the Fifth
Amendment) and notwithstanding an explicit text empowering the federal government to enact
appropriate legislation to enforce rights to equal treatment from the states (that is, the Fourteenth
Amendment), we have moved from a constitutional regime in which the federal Fugitive Slave
Law is enforced, to a constitutional regime in which federal statutes to aid descendants of former
slaves and other racial minority groups are constitutionally suspect. Adarand stands as a
particularly dramatic example of the Court's re-understanding of unchanged constitutional text
(the Fifth Amendment) in light of the Court's understanding of later constitutional commitments.
32. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 377; see also id. at 381 ("The conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing - one person, one vote.").
33. Cf Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (rejecting First Amendment
freedom of association challenge to application of anti-discrimination law to private association).
Jaycees did not involve the Court's implication of restrictions on the action of the federal
government that were identical to those imposed on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
but rather involved the indirect use of the Fourteenth Amendment as support for state government
regulation claimed to violate the First Amendment. The Court found that the state's "compelling
interest in eradicating [gender] discrimination" supported the constitutionality of a statute that
interfered with the decision of the Jaycees, a private association, to discriminate based on gender
in membership. Id. at 623. In explaining the high importance of this state interest, the Court
discussed its Fourteenth Amendment case law:
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Whether any single amendment to an existing constitutional text
should, or will, be understood to affect our understanding of pre-existing
principles will depend on a host of circumstances, including whether the

amendment in question is understood as a narrow exception to a preexisting norm or as a broader shift in values. As Professor Strauss has
observed, the significance of a proposed flag burning amendment could
be limited to the precise case of flag burning, if it were seen as a narrow
exception to a more general First Amendment principle, or could instead
be interpreted as authorizing government prohibition of a wider variety
'
of "secular blasphem[ies]." 34
Holistic interpretation should try to give
honest weight to constitutional change; a single amendment on a discrete
topic may differ from a series of amendments on related principles. A
single amendment authorizing the prohibition of a single form of expressive conduct should not be read as standing for a broader principle, particularly one inconsistent not only with a wide swathe of First
Amendment law, but with the implications of the limitations on treason
found in Article III of the Constitution and the implicit demands of a
representative government for free political expression.35 By contrast,
the cumulative impact of the series of franchise expanding, equality
expanding amendments is not captured fully by specific intentions of
particular electorates that at different times ratified these different
amendments.3 6 To the extent that constitutional law is constituted by
In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal Protection Clause, this
Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals
to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual
abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies
society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life.
See, e. g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-745 (1984); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684-687 (1973) (plurality opinion). These concerns are strongly implicated
with respect to gender discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods
and services.
Id. at 625. But cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked
power under either the Commerce Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to establish a
civil rights remedy for gender-motivated assaults).
34. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1503-04. The amendment would not, however, be
"irrelevant" because, on either view, it would permit regulation that, prior to its enactment, was
forbidden.

35. See U.S. CoNsr. art III,
§ 3; see also Communist Party of United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 51, 168 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Vicki C.
Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and StructuralReasoning, 2001 Sup. CT.REv. 299, 319-20
(discussing Australian High Court decisions finding implicit in commitments to representative
democracy guarantees of freedom of political expression).
36. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Equal ProtectionIncorporation,88 VA. L. REv. 951, 952-53 (2002)
(arguing that levels of scrutiny in equal protection analysis can be understood as implementing
constitutional commitments against particular forms of discrimination as suggested by subsequent
amendments banning discrimination in voting).
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and helps constitute a national identity, or narrative, 37 across generations, the overlapping concerns of these amendments have an import that
exceeds the circumstances surrounding each particular enactment. And

to the extent constitutional text matters, some amendments matter more
than others and should as a normative matter be viewed as informing
understandings of pre-existing texts.
In order fully to recognize the cumulative impact and import of
these equality affirming, franchise expanding constitutional amend-

ments, we must reason not only from the past, assuming the priority of
the "original" Constitution and asking how it has been changed (and
often with a presumption against change not clearly expressed in the
amending text).38 We must also reason from the present to the past that is, ask how, in the light of these more recent democratic commitments, the older parts of the Constitution should now be understood,
with a presumption that the older parts should be read and understood in
light of the newer.39 An interactive process of holistic constitutional
interpretation contemplates both reasoning from the past to the present
and from the present to the past, taking account of more recent amendments as well as the eighteenth century text. Reasoning in both directions is intended to better accommodate a fixed and difficult-to-amend
constitution with fundamental values of democratic self-rule, which, I
have argued, are better served by giving somewhat greater effect and
priority to more recent amendments, as expressing the views of more

recent supermajorities pursuant to the formal amendment process."
37. Cf MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURT 182 (1999).
38. Cf. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (refusing to interpret
Fourteenth Amendment as a "radica[l] change . . . in the relations of the State and Federal
governments" absent more express language).
39. I am reasoning from a general approach to interpretation that takes into account concerns
for the intent of the drafters and enacters, but does not accord those intentions the primacy that
some would favor. The Court's development of constitutional law is very much based on a
common law method of reasoning, not just from text but from precedents and changing social
conditions. See David Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877 (1996). As Richard Fallon has shown us, constitutional interpretation must often draw on a
number of methodologies for sound decision-making. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1189 (1987). And
although strong versions of Professor Amar's "intra-textualism" seem somewhat unrealistic to me
as a primary basis for interpretation, I have learned from and been influenced by Professor Amar's
insightful descriptionlof a process of constitutional change in which we come to re-understand
pre-existing provisions through the lens of later events. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Case of the
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 153 (1992) (noting
changing paradigm of what First Amendment, originally and then as incorporated against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects - from the newspaper editor who speaks for
the people to the dissident abolitionists).
40. Jackson, supra note 3, at 1288-92. Even if we gave priority to more recent amendments,
we are still not capturing what current majorities or supermajorities need, but we are giving
weight to views of majorities closer in time to the present and thus more likely to share the same
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As I have laid out this approach in earlier writing,4 1 I will only
briefly note here the important debt I owe to Charles Black, whose work
on structure and relationship in constitutional law is foundational to my
conception of holistic interpretation. As is well known, Black argued
for the "method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the Constitution in all its parts or in some principal part."'4 2 This
method, he argued, would not displace other forms of reasoning but add
to them, concentrating on the "practical rightness" to which he believed
the method led. My claim builds on but goes beyond Black's, in that I
argue that some later amendments should be given greater weight when
multiple amendments reflect important values in tension with assumptions of earlier texts. In the interpretive process, the preexisting Constitution should be reconciled to the newer amendments, in addition to the
more common effort to domesticate new amendments to the "basic" or
foundational structure. The vector of synthetic reasoning, in other
words, should move from the present back through the older Constitution as well as (more conventionally) from the founding to the present,
in our collective efforts to define constitutional meaning.
My basic argument in support of this approach is one of constitutional legitimacy in a representative democracy. I begin from the proposition that constitutionalism depends on sustaining a workable tension
between democratic self-rule and constitutional (self)-restraint.4 3 In the
United States, textual amendment of the Constitution is unusually difficult. In light of its difficulty, giving more weight to more recent amendments is an appropriate way of managing the tension between
constitutionalism and self-rule. At the time the 1789 Constitution was
drafted, and continuing through much of the twentieth century, large
experiences and values of today's popular constituency than the experiences and values of
eighteenth century framers or even of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
41. Id. at 1281-92.
42. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7
(1969).
43. Whether and to what extent the Constitution should be understood as a form of "selfrestraint" is a large question discussed in the literature that examines the Constitution as a form of
inter-temporal "pre-commitment." See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON
THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995); Bruce Ackerman, Discovering the
Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1045-57 (1984); Jeremy Waldron, Banking ConstitutionalRights:
Who Controls Withdrawals?, 52 ARK. L. REv. 533, 535-59 (1999); cf. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS 88-103 (1979) (analyzing political precommitments in democratic states). To the
extent that a constitution can be so understood, that understanding depends on rather large
assumptions about temporal continuities, and representativeness, of "the people" acting at any one
time, or on assumptions of consent to the actions of earlier generations by virtue of living in a
society governed by the Constitution. These assumptions are, to varying degrees, so heroic that
theories other than those of "self'-imposed restraints must be understood to contribute to
commitments to constitutionalism, including its value in protecting human rights as well as in
facilitating democratic self-governance.
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portions of the adult voting population were effectively excluded from
political participation. Treating the original Constitution as presumptively untouched by later amendments, absent clear statement, gives
added weight to decisions made by much earlier and less inclusively
constituted generations of decision-makers. 44 Recognizing the gravitational pull of the more recent amendments (enacted by a more inclusive
and democratic voting polity) on the entire Constitution is a better
expression of democratic constitutionalism than are interpretive rules
that privilege older portions of constitutional text because of their age.45
In order to infer continuing democratic consent to the constitution, the
power of living generations to make changes in the Constitution must be
recognized and given an ungrudging interpretation.4 6 And where broad

new commitments emerge from multiple acts of constitution making
over time by multiple majorities, it is particularly important to the Constitution's democratic legitimacy to give those newer commitments

effect in understanding what the rest of the Constitution must mean in
their light.4 7
44. Women were excluded from entitlement to vote until 1920; African Africans were not
enfranchised as a matter of formal federal law until the Fifteenth Amendment, and were in large
numbers prevented from exercising their formal legal rights at least until well into the 1960s. For
discussions of the implications of the exclusion of women from the creation of most of the
Constitution's text, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 465 (1995); Mary E. Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for
Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975, 1025-31 (1993); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of
Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 453
(1992).
45. For my earlier treatment of objections based on the concept of an amendment and on
demands of coherence, see Jackson, supra note 3, at 1285-88. A theory grounded in democracy
must recognize that the "will" of the supermajorities might, in theory, be to constrain judicial
implications from the enacted text. But it is notoriously difficult to assign a popular will on the
interpretive implications of amendments, especially given the "up/down" character of voting on
amendments and the limited opportunities for participation in their framing. Popular
understandings of U.S. constitutionalism, moreover, suggest that it is perfectly sensible to read the
suffrage-expanding amendments together as constituting a new constitutional commitment to
equality - an equality whose contours remain highly contested, but whose ultimate value is not.
46. For a different but not unrelated approach to democratic constitutionalism, see Robert
Post & Reva Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2026 (2003) (arguing
for the importance "of ensuring that constitutional law remains in touch with the constitutional
beliefs and experience of the American people."). For grudging and ungenerous interpretations of
the Civil War Amendments, see, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (narrowly
construing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as not supporting the constitutionality of a
federal ban on race discrimination in certain public facilities); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (narrowly construing privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
47. A single amendment to an existibg Constitution represents only one vote, or set of votes,
generally held within a limited window of time. The gravity of the equality principle of the U.S.
Constitution comes, in part, from its having been instantiated in multiple amendments, enacted in
different periods and extending to different groups, over a much longer period of time.
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One cannot, then, ask simply how the intentions of the framers and
ratifiers of the First Amendment should be translated into today's world
in order to give effect to that vision. One must somehow incorporate in
that question the changed understanding of the First Amendment that is
entailed by a constitutional commitment to the "equal protection of the
laws" and the primacy of one-person, one-vote principles at most levels
of political governance.4 8 Thus, it is not the task of a constitutional
interpreter to "construct a text - a reading - that in the current context
' 49
has the same meaning as the original text in its original context,
where the "current context" includes new constitutional commitments.
As Professor Lessig recognizes, Bolling is a form of constitutional synthesis, not translation. 0 My argument is that the domain of constitutional synthesis extends more broadly than many envision.
First Amendment jurisprudence already to a considerable degree
integrates commitment to the importance of elections in its strong protection for "political speech." This idea has been immanent in understandings of the First Amendment since at least the early nineteenth
century. As David Rabban wrote, "[D]espite persistent disputes about
the meaning of free speech ... since the ratification of the First Amendment, Americans overwhelmingly have agreed that constitutionally protected speech is essential to the proper operation of democracy.""1 The
Constitution's commitment to equality as a very basic norm is, by contrast, something relatively new in our constitutional order, something
that has become foundational only after the inception of the constitutional scheme. The Fourteenth Amendment's words of equality enter
the constitutional chronology almost eighty years after the First Amendment; delay in acceptance of equality principles in the fabric of national
and state law led some to question whether the Fourteenth Amendment
should have been considered a "sham" constitutional provision for much
of its life.5 2 Although the Court invalidated state legislation under the
Equal Protection Clause before it invalidated any state or federal statute
48. One might also inquire whether and how the First Amendment freedoms are affected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's capacious concept of "liberty" (beyond application to the states) and
of the "privileges and immunities of citizenship, questions I note but do not further address.
49. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity as Translation: Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1365, 1370 (1997).
50. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 395, 409-10 (1995).
51. DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870-1920, at 12-13 (1997).
Rabban suggests that "consensus about the connection between free speech and democracy may
be the single unifying free speech theme through American history." Id. at 13.
52. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITuTIONALISM

AND

DEMOCRACY:

(Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).

TRANSITIONS

IN THE

CONTEMPORARY

WORLD

3, 8

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:265

under the First Amendment,5 3 the Court did not clearly disavow a jurisprudence permitting formal separation of the races until 1954." 4 And
while judicial enforcement of the First Amendment was weak until well

after World War 1,55 the reference point in much of the Court's twentieth
century First Amendment analysis is to an earlier time and framework.5 6
The chronology reflected in the Court's analysis, even if we see it
as more of a conceptual chronology of where in time in the constitutional narrative certain rights are located than a historical chronology of

when those rights become the subject of sympathetic judicial interpretation, places the First Amendment well before the Fourteenth. For example, at the core of the Court's conclusion in Buckley v. Valeo57 that
expenditure limits are unconstitutional is the proposition that equality
interests do not justify government efforts to suppress speech-related
uses of money. Reading the First Amendment through the lens of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its progeny, however, would suggest that
human equality is a relevant governmental interest for purposes of
applying these older parts of the Constitution, as the Court arguably
53. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (reversing state murder conviction on
ground that state statute unconstitutionally excluded black persons from jury service).
54. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The disavowal of racial classifications
was even then cautious, rather than clear and wholehearted. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985
(1956) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality of law prohibiting inter-racial
relationships).
55. The First Amendment as a judicially enforceable tool for the protection of dissent does
not begin to mature in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence until the World War I period. See
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). By the 1930s, the Court
had invalidated convictions for dissident speech on First Amendment grounds. See Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); see also Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1927). Professor Rabban identifies some lower court decisions before World War I
in which free speech concerns motivate dismissals of prosecutions. See Rabban, supra note 5 1, at
117-21, 132, 145-46. State courts protected free speech rights in some political speech, election
and libel cases. Id. at 153-63. Rabban also concluded that judicial opinion was less protective of
free speech in the pre-WWI period than was the public, and that the Supreme Court was less
protective than lower courts. Id. at 175.
56. See, e.g., CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 102 (1993)

("One of the most remarkable features [of First Amendment law] is that the Supreme Court
decides whether an area is a 'public forum' by examining nineteenth century common law
rules."). For a more recent example, see United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297,
2304-05 (2003) (treating as relevant fact that Internet is new source and that information exchange
on the Net has not "immemorially been held in trust for the public" to justify rejecting a claim that
the Internet is a "public forum," and rejecting First Amendment challenge to requiring use of
pornography filtering software as a condition for receipt of public library funding). Although
serious judicial enforcement of First Amendment speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment
equality rights may have occurred at times and in an order inconsistent with their enactment dates,
the chronology reflected in the Court's analysis as a conceptual matter locates the First
Amendment at the time of the founding, as the above sources suggest, whereas the Fourteenth
Amendment is understood as a latter-day change. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
238-39 (1972).
57. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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acknowledged in cases like Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees.5 8 Similarly, in
R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul,59 the majority treated an effort to penalize
"fighting words" based on race as a violation of the First Amendment
while giving scant attention to whether equality interests could justify

the line drawn by the statute.
In the event of a conflict between liberty of speech and equality of
persons, holistic interpretation would ask, Is it true that the First Amendment must always remain "first"?6" Are there principled reasons to

think that the best reconciliation is to treat First Amendment rules as
unaffected by later constitutional commitments to equality? 6 Are there
principled bases on which to synthesize First Amendment commitments
to liberty and constitutional commitments to equality? The approaches
of other Western democracies may prove helpful in answering these

questions.

58. 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
59. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
60. See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 12; cf Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First
Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956).
61. An argument from a deeply negative conception of rights might deny the need for
reconciliation. If both the First Amendment and the equal protection principle were understood
simply as constraints on government action, perhaps they would not come into conflict and there
would be no reason to rethink the First Amendment in light of equality principles. A changed
understanding of the First Amendment in light of the Fourteenth that would have the effect of
authorizing government restriction of private liberty, otherwise prohibited by the First
Amendment, would restrict some liberty; it might thus be suggested that the protection of liberty
is a reason of principle not to read the Fourteenth Amendment as at all affecting First Amendment
freedoms of speech. But the "simply constraints" view is inaccurate, insofar as the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly authorized federal legislation that, the Court has held, can restrict conduct
beyond that involved in direct violations of its provisions. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The "negative" view
also fails to capture the role in current constitutional law that the Fourteenth Amendment has
played in providing permission (or a reason) for state regulation of some liberties in the interests
of equality. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-29. The racial equality norms of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, moreover, have been invoked to restrain what some might view as
constitutionally protected liberties of association. See Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1959). These norms have also been
invoked to penalize, in some settings, racial or sexual harassment that takes the form of speech.
Compare Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment
Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1011, 1013-17, 1019, 1031 (1996) with Deborah Epstein, Free
Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-BasedDiscriminatory (Mis)Treatment, 85 GEo.
L.J. 649 (1997). See also Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 439-49. We as a polity and our constitutional
jurisprudence are thus in some respects already beyond the point of treating First Amendment
freedoms as unaffected by later constitutional developments - though we in our judicial opinions
often write and perhaps think as if that were the case.
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HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION AND LEARNING FROM THE
POST WORLD WAR

II

CONSTITUTIONS

Reading the "older" Constitution through the lens of the more
recent amendments is actually fairly difficult for an American constitutionalist. We are conditioned in our law school training to begin with
"the founding." We are trained to develop theories that account for most
(though not necessarily all) decisions. We continue to focus on U.S.
Supreme Court decisions as the grist for our mill, for the most part, and
those Supreme Court decisions have privileged the 1789 Constitution
and its virtually accompanying Bill of Rights in important and not
always visible ways.6 2 What would our constitutional law of freedom of
speech look like if we were to "read" the First Amendment through the

lens of later constitutional commitments to equality of citizenship, or if,
in other words, freedom of speech had always been understood as a

commitment contemporaneous with commitments to equality?
To aid in this re-imagining process, it is useful to consult compara-

tive constitutional law.

Many Western nations have constitutions

strongly influenced by that of the United States, both positively, insofar
as they include written limitations on government powers to be enforced

through some form of judicial review, and negatively, insofar as some
63
seek to avoid language that could give rise to Lochner-type decisions.

Becoming aware of how constitutional courts in other democratic
nations with written constitutions approach similar problems has many
potential benefits, in deepening understanding of the possibilities of
interpretations that are available and also of deepening understanding of

what is distinctive about our own constitutional commitments. In addition, deliberating about the choices made by other courts in actual cases

may improve the quality of judicial reasoning by calling on judges to
account -

to themselves and others -

through reasoning about why

other democratic nations' constitutional practices are inapposite, distin62. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-13 (1883) (holding unconstitutional
federal public accommodations law as beyond authority of Congress under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it was directed at private action unsupported by state law); The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (reviewing course of amendments and
rejecting, absent more clear language, argument that Fourteenth Amendment profoundly changed
relations between federal and state governments with respect to protection of civil rights); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (suggesting that while the scope of federal
authority with respect to the states had expanded, the underling structure of, and limitations on,
that authority had not changed since the 1789 founding).
63. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, 2 INT'L.
J. CONST. L. 1 (2004); Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitutionand the
Rise of "World Constitutionalism," 2000 Wis. L. REV. 597 (2000); Kim Lane Scheppele,
Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional
Influence Through Negative Models, 1 IN'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003).
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guishable from or (perhaps even) helpful to understanding a problem in
U.S constitutional law.64
Unlike our Constitution, a number of other modem constitutions
came of age in more recent times in which guarantees of equality coexist
with other rights provisions from the outset.6 5 Looking at decisions in
such systems that share similar normative commitments to liberal
democracy may help illuminate what a constitutional jurisprudence fully
informed by commitments to human equality, undertaken at the same
time as those to freedom of speech, might look like.
Canada, for example, adopted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982, after a several year process of discussion and debate.6 6 Section 2
of the Charter protects freedom of expression, and section 15 of the
Charter guarantees equality of treatment.6 7 Section 1 of the Charter is
understood to permit a law infringing other Charter rights to be upheld if
it is "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. ' 68 In free
expression cases, the Supreme Court of Canada construes section 2
broadly, readily finding infringements when the government regulates or
prohibits speech (including criminal solicitations), but then measures the
ultimate validity of the law through a section 1 analysis. Section 1 as
interpreted requires a structured form of balancing in which infringements of constitutional values are upheld if authorized by law and proportionally related to both their legitimate governmental objective and
the harm to constitutionally protected interests.69 In its opinions, the
Canadian Supreme Court has upheld statutes found to constitute
infringements on free speech rights in light of the government's interest
in promoting equality values expressed in sections 15 or 27 of the Charter.7 ° The mediating principle between interests in speech and equality
is found in the Court's section 1 jurisprudence of proportionality. 71
64. It is also possible that comparative constitutional experience is more likely to be helpful
in some areas than others. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, 51 DuKE L.J.
223 (2001) (arguing that comparative constitutional decisions are more likely to be of assistance
to individual human rights issues than to federalism issues).
65. Other constitutional systems differ from ours in not having written Bills of Rights, but
nonetheless extrapolating from basic commitments to representative democracy some judicially
enforceable limits on legislative action. See, e.g., Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth
of Australia, 104 A.L.R. 389 (1992).
66. See CHARTER OF RiGHTS AND FREEDOMS, CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 (Canada).
67. Id.,
§§ 2, 15.
68. Id.,
§ I.
69. See generally R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135-43 (Supreme Court of Canada).
70. See, e.g.,
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Supreme Court of Canada); R. v. Butler,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Supreme Court of Canada).
71. For more detailed discussion of proportionality, see infra text accompanying notes 15160. Canada's Supreme Court readily finds infringements of section 2 expression rights and then
evaluates constitutionality under section I. Section 15 equality cases seem more likely to get
resolved on question of infringement of section 15 itself rather than in the section I setting, though
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Thus, in Keegstra,72 the Canadian Supreme Court narrowly upheld
a criminal statue prohibiting the willful promotion of hatred against
minority groups as against a freedom of expression claim. 73 Recognizing that the conduct being punished was speech, the court concluded that
the limitation was "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" because it promoted constitutional values of equality and, in
Canada, multiculturalism, while being sufficiently narrowly drawn to
avoid chilling more valuable speech.7 4 In Butler, the court upheld a pornography statute in part because it served values of gender equality.7 5
And in Libman v. Attorney General,76 the Canadian court, while striking
down a law that substantially restricted independent expenditures in a
referendum election, indicated its support for another statute regulating
expenditures in elections for public office, 77 and indicated that if the
the Canadian court has on occasion found a section 15 violation but upheld the statute under
section 1 analysis. See Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (Supreme Court of Canada)
(upholding rule limiting government jobs to citizens; a plurality of four Justices finds violations of
section 15 but upholds the rule as demonstrably justified under section 1; two Justices find no
section 15 violation at all; three dissenting Justices argue that section 15 is violated but without
saving justification under section 1).
72. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Supreme Court of Canada).
73. Id. at 795.
74. Id. at 758, 771-78.
75. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 478-81, 493-94 (Supreme Court Canada).
76. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (Supreme Court of Canada). Since Libman, both provincial and
national election statutes have been revised to provide for increased limits on third party
expenditures. The constitutionality of the third party expenditure limits of the Election Act of
2000 was at issue in Harper v. Canada (A.G.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764 (Supreme Court of Canada)
(staying an interlocutory injunction against enforcement of the provisions of the 2000 Act);
Harper v. Canada (A.G.), 223 D.L.R. (4th) 275, 2002 AB. C. LEXIS 2671 (Alta. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding invalid under the Charter the third party spending limits of the 2000 Act), motion for
leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada granted by 227 D.L.R. (4th) vii (2003); see also
Harper, 223 D.L.R. (4th) at 340, 2002 AB. C. LEXIS at *100 (Berger, J.A., dissenting); Canada
(Comm'r of Elections) v. Nat'l Citizens Coalition, 2003 O.J. No. 3420, 2003 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS
7075 (Ont. Ct. Justice 2003) (finding invalid a registration requirement for groups spending more
than $500 on political advertising). For discussion, see Colin Feasby, Issue Advocacy and Third
Parties in the United Kingdom and Canada, 48 McGILL L.J. 11, 31-32 (2003) [hereinafter Feasby,
Issue Advocacy]; Andrew C. Geddis, Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent
Expenditures: A Comparative View, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5 (2001). More recently, Canada
has enacted a ban on contributions by labor unions and businesses, together with some measure of
public financing of elections. See An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act & Income Tax Act,
ch. 19, 2002-03 Bill C-24 (Can.); Closing the Private Purse, EcONOMIST, July 12, 2003.
77. Libman, 3 S.C.R. at 604-05, 618-20; see also id. at 602 ("Limits on independent spending
are essential to maintain an equilibrium in the financial resources available to candidates and
political parties and thus ensure the fairness of elections.") At present there appears to be a
tension between the views of the Supreme Court as expressed in Libman and the views of the
Alberta Court of Appeals in Harper on this point. See Harper, 223 D.L.R. (4th) at 318-27, 2002
AB. C. LEXIS at *73-88 (disagreeing that Libman analysis establishes a sufficiently substantial
and pressing concern about role of third party expenditures in Canada to warrant restrictions under
section 1 analysis).
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limits on independent expenditures were higher, they would be upheld.7 8
The Canadian court recognized a broader governmental interest in the
fairness of elections, an interest extending beyond the anticorruption
concerns recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley, specifically
an interest in equal opportunities to participate in communicating with
the electorate.79 As the Supreme Court of Canada explained,
The principle of electoral fairness flows directly from a principle
entrenched in the Constitution: that of political equality of citizens. If
the principle of fairness in the political sphere is to be preserved, it
cannot be presumed that all persons have the same financial resources
to communicate with the electorate. To ensure a right of equal participation in democratic government, laws limiting spending are needed
to preserve the equality of democratic rights and ensure that one person's exercise of freedom to spend does not hinder the communication opportunities of others. 8 °
For this reason, as well, the court stated, "Limits on independent spending are essential to maintain an equilibrium in the financial resources
available to candidates and political parties and thus ensure the fairness
of elections."'8' The Canadian court thus recognized as legitimate an
interest in equalizing the influence of money on the dissemination of
information to voters, an interest deemed illegitimate in Buckley.8 2 Furthermore, the Canadian court recognized the need to reconcile freedom
of expression with political equality.8 3 Note that the court formulates its
78. Libman, 3 S.C.R. at 617-20.
79. Id.at 595-97, 598-99. See also David Strauss, Corruption, Equality and Campaign
FinanceReform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1994) (arguing that approach focused on equal rights
of candidates supports limitations of independent expenditures).
80. Libman, 3 S.C.R. at 598-99 (internal citations omitted).
81. Id. at 602. According to Elizabeth Garrett, the Quebec law was amended in response to
Libman. Elizabeth Garrett, Issues in Implementing Referendums in Israel: A Comparative Study
in Direct Democracy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 159, 178 n.146 (2001) (discussing An Act to Amend the
Election Act, the Referendum Act and Other Legislative Provisions, Statutes of Quebec 894
(1998), which now also allows and regulates "private interveners"). See also Feasby, Issue
Advocacy, supra note 76; Colin Feasby, Libman v. Quebec and the Administration of the Process
of Democracy under the Charter: The Emerging EgalitarianModel, 44 McGILL L.J. 5 (1999).
82. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). One scholar has identified as central to
Libman the concern that "a right to equal participation in democratic government" not be
compromised. See Geddis, supra note 76, at 99.
83. See Libman, 3 S.C.R. at 606-07 (emphasis added):
[T]he legislature's objective, namely to enhance the exercise of the right to vote,
must be borne in mind. Thus, while the impugned provisions do in a way restrict
one of the most basic forms of expression, namely political expression, the
legislaturemust be accorded a certain deference to enable it to arbitratebetween
the democratic values of freedom of expression and referendum fairness. The latter
is relatedto the very values the CanadianCharterseeks to protect, in particularthe
political equality of citizens that is at the heart of a free and democratic society.
The impugned provisions impose a balance between the financial resources
available to the proponents of each option in order to ensure that the vote by the
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analysis both as a balance between freedom and equality and in Fiss-ian
terms as involving provisions "not purely restrictive of freedom of
expression."8 4
Claims that government intervention in the distribution of information is necessary to protect free elections, it would appear, are subject to
careful scrutiny in Canada and do not necessarily trump free speech concerns. In Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.),8" the court struck
down a statute prohibiting publication of polling information within
three days of an election as unduly restrictive on speech rights. Scholars
have criticized the apparent tension between Libman's assumption that
without government intervention voters may be unduly influenced by
wealthier candidates and parties and its assumption in Thomson that voters are sophisticated enough that with disclosure of polling methods they
can appropriately discount for inaccuracies and bias in the polls.8 6 But
whatever the consistency of the Canadian case law in resolving notoriously difficult constitutional problems, Libman at least sought to bring
together in analysis constitutional commitments to electoral equality and
constitutional commitments to freedom of expression.
The European Court of Human Rights has similarly recognized
governmental interests in equality of expenditures on behalf of candidates as a "legitimate aim" for purposes of determining whether a derogation of free expression is permissible. In Bowman v. United
Kingdom,87 at issue was the validity under the European Human Rights
Convention of a British law prohibiting all independent expenditures of
more than five pounds with respect to a particular candidate during an
election period. Although recognizing the legitimacy of the aim of the
legislative scheme to promote equality between candidates and voters,
the European Court of Human Rights found the measure disproportionately to intrude on freedom of expression. 88 The court found it of particular significance how low the limit on independent expenditures was,
treating it as virtually a total barrier to independent persons expressing
people will be free and informed and that the discourse of each option can be heard.
To attain this objective, the legislature had to try to strike a balance between
absolute freedom of individual expression and equality among the different
expressions for the benefit of all. From this point of view, the impugned provisions
are therefore not purely restrictive of freedom of expression. Their primary purpose
is to promote political expression by ensuring an equal dissemination of points of
view and thereby truly respecting democratic traditions.
84. Id.
85. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.

86. See Geddis, supra note 76, at 95-99 (drawing attention to tension between rationale in
Libman about risks of undue influence of wealth in election process and Thomson's model of
rational voters able to discount skewed polls).
87. Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 E.H.R.R. 1 (1998) (U.K.).
88. Id. at 10-13 (para. 38-47).
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their opinion, and concluded that the intrusion on freedom of expression
was disproportionate. The opinion would appear to leave open, as
Libman did, the possibility that a less stringent limitation would be
upheld.89

In Germany, the Basic Law of 1949 begins with provisions of basic
rights. Article 3 states that "all persons shall be equal before the law,"
and includes specific gender equality guarantees as well.9" Article 3

specifically provides that there can be neither favoring nor disfavoring
"because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith,
or religious or political opinion," and prohibiting any disfavoring due to
disability. 9 ' Article 5 guarantees "freedom of expression": "Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in
speech, writing and pictures," as well as to inform himself.92 Freedom
of the press is specifically guaranteed, and censorship is prohibited.9 3
According to a leading American scholar of German constitutional law,
Donald Kommers, the German court has developed a constitutional
jurisprudence in which a "hierarchy of values" is deployed to reconcile
competing constitutional values. 94 Thus, he suggests, Article 5 "'operates within an interrelated set of other fundamental rights and liberties,
constitutional principles, rules and standards, institutional and procedural devices."' 95
Coexisting with the commitment to understanding Article 5 within
this "interrelated set of other fundamental rights" is a recognition of the
89. See Feasby, Issue Advocacy, supra note 76 at 13, 18, 24-31; see also K. D. Ewing, The
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 - Implications for Trade Unions, 30

Industrial L.J. 199 (2001) (discussing the 2000 Act, which is described as instituting higher limits
on third party spending in order to avoid conflict with Bowman). Implementing understandings of
proportionality in election law is difficult, as experience in both Canada and Europe suggest.
Although Canada's law was amended in response to Libman, its constitutionality remains to be
fully tested. See Feasby, Issue Advocacy, supra note 76, at 31-45 (discussing whether Canadian
and British laws are overbroad). The constitutionality of recently enacted prohibitions on
corporate and labor union expenditures for certain "electioneering communications" was before
the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of initial writing of this Essay; these restrictions have now
been upheld in McConnell v. FEC, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). Rulemaking proceedings before the
FEC are pending as this Essay goes to press. See FEC Notice 2004-6 (Mar. 4, 2004).
90. Grundgesetz [federal constitution] art. 3 §§ 2,3 (F.R.G.) (translation published by German
Press and Information Office, with amendments through July 16, 1998). The Basic Law is the
constitution of Germany.
91. Id. art. 3, § 3
92. Id.art. 5, § 1.
93. Id.
94. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
OF GERMANY
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361 (2d ed. 1997).

95. Id. (quoting Helmut
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central importance of freedom of expression.96 According to the German

court, "[T]he basic right to freedom of opinion is the most immediate
expression of the human personality living in society and, as such, one
of the noblest of human rights"; the court goes on to refer to Justice
Cardozo's well-known comments on freedom of speech as the "indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom."9 7 Because of the
"fundamental importance of freedom of speech in the liberal democratic
state," the German court said, the substance of this basic right cannot be
limited by an ordinary law.9 8 Thus, notwithstanding the reference to
general laws as limiting rights set forth in Article 5, the general laws
must themselves be interpreted in light of those basic rights.

As in Canada, commitments to human dignity and equality inform
the German court's analysis of free speech issues. While this is revealed
in a number of areas, 9 9 one notable example is the "Holocaust Denial"
case.1"' The basic question was whether it was consistent with Article 5
to make it a criminal offense (enforceable through a prior restraint),1 0 ' to
deny the massive slaughter of Jews by Germany during World War II.
In upholding the government's authority to restrict such "holocaust
denial" speech, the court distinguished between dissemination of opinion (most highly protected) and dissemination of claims of fact, while
recognizing that the two are also intimately connected. But, the court
96. Id.
97. Luth Case, 7 BVerfGE 798 (1958), translated and reprinted in KOMMERS, supra note 94,
at 364-65.
98. Id. at 365 (discussing the Article 5(2) reference to "general laws").
99. See, e.g., KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 419-24. The German court has also on occasion
invalidated laws relating to political contributions. In the Party Finance Case II of 1958, it
concluded that a provision permitting the deductibility of political party contributions from
income tax violated the "basic right of political parties to equal opportunity" because deductibility
benefited corporate and higher income taxpayers over lower income taxpayers and, in light of
differences between parties relating to the different interests of prospective donors, concluded that
the challenged provisions "favor those parties whose program and activities appeal to wealthy
circles" and were invalid. Party Finance Case II, 8 BverfGE 51 (1958), translated and reprinted
in KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 201-03. As Kommers describes a complex series of decisions, the
court reaffirmed this holding in the early1990s. See KOMMERS, supra note 94 at 214-15
(discussing Party Finance Case VII, 85 BverfGE 264 (1992)).
100. Holocaust Denial Case, 90 BverfGE 241 (1994), translatedand reprinted in KOMMERS,
supra note 94, at 382-87. I adopt here Professor Kommer's title of the case and am indebted to his
book for its commentary and translation of the case. See also Winfried Brugger, Ban On or
Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 17 TUL.
EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1 (2002).
101. The United States' strong commitments against prior restraints of speech, even where the
speech may give rise to criminal penalties, is a relatively distinctive feature of U.S. free
expression jurisprudence compared to others around the world. See Roger Errarra, The Freedom
of the Press: The United States, France and Other European Countries, in CONSTrrrUIONALISM
AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CoNsTrrTroN ABROAD 63, 83-84 (Louis
Henkin & Albert J Rosenthal eds., 1990); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and
Canada, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 10, 24 (1992).
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concluded, there is less value to a statement of fact that is "demonstrably
untrue."' °2 Indeed, "taken on its own," a false statement of fact "does
not enjoy the protection of freedom of expression."'' 0 3 It went on to
consider the statement in connection with the speaker's opinions (protected by Article 5) that German politics has been susceptible to "political blackmail," and upheld the restriction on holocaust denial as a
justified limitation on Article 5 protections. Its reasoning explicitly
invoked another constitutional right, "the right of personality" guaranteed by Article 2 of the Basic Law, and noted with approval as well the
lower court's argument that the utterance of false holocaust denial is
inconsistent with the "individuality" of Jews, in light of the "historical
fact" that they were "singled out" under the Nuremberg laws:
[W]hat happened [then] is also present in this relationship [between
Jews and the Federal Republic] today. It is part of their personal selfperception to be understood as part of a group of people who stand
out by virtue of their fate and in relation to whom there is a special
moral responsibility on the part of all others, and that this is part of
their dignity. Respect for this self-perception, for each individual, is
one of the guarantees against repetition of this kind of discrimination
and forms a basic condition of their lives in the Federal Republic.
Whoever seeks to deny these events denies vis a vis each individual
the personal worth of [Jewish persons.] For the person concerned,
this is continuing discrimination against the group to which he
belongs and, as part of the group, against him."°
Thus, concerns for the human dignity and equality of Jews were
invoked, in a morally distinctive manner, to uphold restrictions on
speech about a historical fact.' 0
Both Canada and Germany, through different doctrinal formulations, have brought into an explicit balance and interplay commitments
to freedom of expression and commitments to human equality. In doing
so, these courts have reached judgments quite different from those that
have been reached in the United States; though in Canada, it should be
noted that Keegstra, the "hate speech" decision, was rendered by a
closely divided court. Both Germany and Canada are generally regarded
102. Holocaust Denial Case, translatedand reprinted in KoMMERS, supra note 94, at 384-85.
103. The court distinguishes between "representations of fact still of uncertain accuracy at the
time they are uttered, and unverifiable within a short time," on the one hand, and cases like the
instant one "when the falsity of the statement is already established." Id. at 387.

104. Id. at 386 (quoting from Constitutional Court decision quoting from a decision of the
Federal Court of Justice); see also Brugger, supra note 89 at 8-20.
105. Cf James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J.
1279 (2000) (arguing that attachment to honor underlies European commitments to human dignity
in ways not fully captured simply by looking at post-World War H constitutions). In the
Holocaust Denial Case, the denial is arguably treated as a form of "defamation" or personal insult
to Jews, in derogation of their right not to be discriminated against.
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as enjoying a serious level of democratic constitutionalism. 10 6 The German court has for some years been regarded as among the most influential of the national constitutional courts in Europe, and in recent years,
the Canadian Supreme Court's jurisprudence has been regarded as particularly important in countries around the world." 7 Each could fairly
be regarded as among the leading constitutional courts in the world, a
group that includes the United States Supreme Court. Their reasoning
on these difficult issues does not show that the U.S. Court is wrong;
indeed, most commentators (and all of the Justices) regard the result in
R.A.V. as correct, although there is disagreement on the reasoning. But
what they do show is that under modem conditions states may act
affirmatively to protect equality, and in doing so, limit speech as well as
other forms of conduct while sustaining high levels of democratic
liberties.' 8
To this extent, then, comparative constitutional law from these
other constitutional democracies is suggestive that U.S. courts could
interpret the meaning of freedom of speech with more weight given to
the equality concerns of the later Constitution without impairing a robust
constitutional democracy. In each of the foreign cases discussed above,
the decisions weighed contemporaneously enacted individual rights provisions. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has also faced the
question whether the more recently enacted Charter Rights should be
understood to affect interpretation of the older parts of the Canadian
Constitution, which date to 1867(and largely concern federalist distributions of powers). Section 93 of the 1867 Constitution Act was intended
to guarantee the rights of "dissentient," denominational schools (i.e.,
Catholic schools in predominantly Protestant provinces, and Protestant
schools in Quebec), both those existing in 1867 and (in some respects)
106. One crude measure is the Freedom House Ratings of Political and Civil Liberties,
available at www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countries.htm.
Canada and
Germany, like the United States, have the highest possible rankings (1, 1, f). See also Rankings
Compiled by the Polity IV Project (Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1901-2001),
giving their highest rankings to Germany (10, 10, 0), Canada, Australia, Austria, Costa Rica,
Finland, and Denmark, among others (scores for Polity, Democracy, and Autocracy), availableat

www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm.

"Democracy" is defined there as "the general

openness of political institutions," and "autocracy" as "general closedness of political
institutions." "Polity" is calculated as a combined score, "computed by subtracting autocracy

from democracy."
107. See Aharan Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 110, 114 (2002).
108. Institutional contexts matter, and differ considerably among the United States, Canada,
and Germany. The United States is larger, with decentralized review subject to more constraints
than Canada (i.e., no independent and adequate state ground doctrine in Canada), and might favor
more formalist categorical approaches, as noted below. See also Gerald Neuman, Human Rights
and Constitutional Rights, 53 STAN. L. REV. (2003) (noting that rights have "institutionalist"
aspects that may diverge from supra-national aspects).
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those "thereafter established."'09 After the Charter came into effect,1"'
an Ontario statute providing funding to Catholic schools was challenged
as a violation of section 15's equal protection guarantees. The gist of
the claim was that non-Catholic denominational schools in Ontario did
not receive comparable funding. The challenge was rejected, in part, on
the ground that the Charter should "not be interpreted as rendering
unconstitutional distinctions that are expressly permitted by the Constitution Act, 1867.'"'11
A leading commentator in Canada concludes from this that "the
Charter of Rights, although adopted later in time than the Constitution
Act, 1867, is not to be read as impliedly repealing or amending those
provisions of the earlier instrument that are inconsistent with the unqualified language of s. 15 ....Rather, s. 15 is to be read as qualified by the
language of the earlier instrument."' ' 2 This conclusion, however, may
13
be overdrawn. The principal opinion in the School Funding case,
written by Justice Wilson, laid weight on the explicitness of the guarantee of section 93, its importance to Confederation, and the unlikelihood
that section 15 was intended to undo these protections. 4 That Profes109. See Constitution Act, 1867, § 93(1)-(3) (Can.); PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF CANADA § 54.1 (4th ed. 1997). Section 93's application to Quebec was recently limited. See
Constitutional Amendment, 1997 (Can.) (adding section 93A concerning Quebec).
110. On the history of Canadian constitutional development, see HOGG, supra note 109,
§§ 1.2-1.4; see also Jackson, supra note 3, at 1298-99. Two major periods of constitution-making
should be noted: 1867, when a British statute provided a constitution for Canada, one largely
focused on the division of powers; and 1982, when the constitution became fully "patriated" to
Canada (i.e., could now be amended without British consent) and when a bill of rights - the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms - was formally adopted as part of Canada's constitution.
11. Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario Separate School
Funding), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 1207 (Estey, J.); see also id,at 1197-98 (Wilson, J.) ("It was
never intended, in my opinion, that the Charter could be used to invalidate other provisions of the
Constitution, particularly a provision such as s. 93 which represented a fundamental part of the
Confederation compromise."). The issues discussed in this opinion were complex, involving
distinctions between the different parts of section 93 and Charter section 29. In subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court of Canada has adhered to the view that the Charter and its equality guarantee
cannot be relied on as a basis for attacking the discrimination in favor of Catholic and Protestant
"dissentient" schools specifically authorized in section 93 of the 1867 Constitution Act. See Adler
v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (Supreme Court of Canada). At the same time, the Charter is
invoked to inform interpretation of exercises of pre-existing powers. See infra, text accompanying
notes 116-18; cf. Donahoe v. CBC, 1993 1 S.C.R. 319, 391 (McLachlin, J.) (suggesting a
"distinction between using the Charter to negate another constitutional provision and using the
Charter to ensure that the exercise of a constitutional provision conforms with the Charter," and
giving as an example of the first Reference re Bill 30, and as an example of the second a case
holding that provincial powers of legislative apportionment must comply with the Charter's
guarantee of the right to vote).
112. HOGG, supra note 109, at § 52.9(c).
113. Reference re An Act To Amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C R. 1148.
114. Id. at 1194-99. Justice Wilson also noted in support of the judgment that section 29 of the
Charter itself explicitly indicated that the Charter was not intended to affect section 93 rights. See
id. at 1198 (Wilson, J.) (so arguing but also indicating that section 29 was merely declarative of
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sor Hogg's characterization may be overdrawn is suggested not only by
Justice Wilson's reasoned reliance on the specific provisions of Charter
section 29 preserving the 1867 Act's provisions on dissentient schools,
but also by a more recent lower court decision affirmed by the Canadian
Supreme Court (though without discussion of this point). In the Gun
Reference Case,' 5 Chief Judge Fraser of the Alberta Court of Appeals
described at some length the "importance of interpreting the Constitution Act, 1867 .. .in a way which is consistent with constitutionally
guaranteed equality rights [under the 1982 Charter]".' 16 She argued that
the Charter had already been held to have "pollinating" effects on Canadian common law and statutory interpretation, and there was "no reason
to exclude the Charter, a part of the Canadian Constitution - the
supreme law of the land - from an interpretation of the division of
powers provision in the Constitution Act, 1867."' 17 These two cases
suggests that, in Canada, later enacted rights provisions may be read

back into older power-allocating provisions of a constitution, but that
whether to read later parts as affecting earlier ones may depend on the
centrality of those earlier provisions to founding compromises and on
their explicitness.' 18 In any event, a far larger body of Canadian jurisprudence provides an alternative model for how to integrate constituwhat would have followed in any event, given the centrality of the section 93 compromise on
Catholic and Protestant schools to the Confederation). Section 29 of the Charter provides:
"Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges guaranteed by or
under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational, separate or dissentient schools."
Constitution Act of 1982, R.S.C. 1985, Pt. I,§ 29. Not all of the justices agreed that section 29
was relevant. See 1 S.C.R. at 1209 (Estey, J.).
115. Reference re Firearms Act, [1998] 219 A.R. 201 (Alta. Ct. App. 1998), affd [2000] 1
S.C.R. 783.
116. Id. at 221 (para. 35); see id. at para. 303.
117. Id. at 221 (para. 35). The British Columbia Court of Appeals has distinguished the
continued constitutional value of the compromise over minority religious rights embodied in
section 93, from the Charter's effects on the allocation of powers as between the federal and
provincial governments conferred by sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 Constitution Act. See Egale
Canada, Inc. v. Canada, [2003] B.C. A. C. 35, 58-62, 2003 BC.C. LEXIS 2711, *58-68 (para.
102-12) (B.C. Ct. App., 2003) (rejecting trial court's reasoning that national government would
lack power under section 91(26) to legalize same sex unions if that result were required by Charter
section 15; distinguishing Adler and In re Bill 30 as involving specific compromise over minority
rights found in section 93); see also Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), 65 0. R. (3d) 161, 176 (2003),
2003 ON.C. LEXIS 153, **40 (para. 48) (Ont. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court in British
Columbia had concluded that the Constitution Act of 1867, when it authorized federal regulation
of "marriage" in section 91(26), meant only a union of a man and a woman, and that the Charter
had to be read as limited by this limitation on federal power. See Egale-Canada,182 B.C.A.C. at
42-43, 2003 BC C LEXIS at *13-15 (para. 31) (quoting trial court judgment). The court of
appeals concluded that the common law definition of marriage in 1867 was not fixed into the
meaning of the federal power over marriage under section 91(26). Id at 46-50, 58-62, 2003 BC.
C. LEXIS at *23-27, *29-35, *58-68 (paras. 50-56, 61-71, 102-13).
118. See School Funding Case, [1987] 1 S.C R. at 1197-98 (referring to the provisions of
section 93 as "a fundamental part of the Confederation compromise").
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tional commitments to freedom of expression with constitutional
commitments to equality in an interpretive tradition where, for the most
part, both kinds of constitutional rights enter the constitutional narrative
at the same time.
III.

HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
HARD QUESTIONS

What effect would a more "holistic" form of interpretation,
informed by comparative constitutional law from other Western democracies, have on the freedom of speech problems Owen Fiss has been
concerned about? How would our constitutional law of freedom of
speech change if it were re-envisioned, re-understood, as though the
norms of equality of citizenship and popular election of representatives
had been foundational throughout?11 9 I do not think there are clear
answers to these questions, as is suggested by the disagreement within
other constitutional courts over some of the same hard questions that the
U.S. Supreme Court has addressed. But at a minimum, questions understood as raising conflicts between freedom of speech and equality would
have to be seen as harder cases than some members of the present Court
see them. Asking these questions - about how to reconcile commitments to equality and elections with commitments to freedom of speech,
and about the approaches of other constitutional democracies also committed to these values - may help bring to the surface our embedded
assumptions about the "firstness" of the older Constitution so that we
can interrogate ourselves about those assumptions.
Owen Fiss has argued both that the idea that equality is an "architectonic" principle of the Constitution,12 0 and that the First Amendment
should be understood as committed to the production of a robust public
119. The First Amendment is widely, though not universally, understood most centrally to
protect political speech. Compare Fiss, supra note 7, at 3-4 (arguing that First Amendment
"freedom of speech" should be understood as embodying the goal of robust, political discourse);
SuNIsTrN, supra note 56, at 122 (arguing that the "First Amendment is focused first and foremost
on political deliberation"); and ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONsTrrrIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 55 (1965) with Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake:
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1109 (1993)
(criticizing "collectivist" versions of the First Amendment as failing to recognize that individual
autonomy is inseparable from the goal of deliberative self-government). The concern for political
speech can be explained by reference to the history and internal dynamic of the First Amendment
itself, as well as by a contemporaneous constitutional commitment to a "republican form of
government," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, which arguably requires a well-informed people free to
discuss, criticize and change their governments. The subsequent deepening of the constitutional
commitment to the role of popular elections for political office by an expanded electorate
including previously subordinated groups lends further weight to the centrality of political speech,
while at the same time introducing a greater concern for equality.
120. See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 11.
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debate, with government regulation and intervention to that end thus to
be welcomed.1 2 1 He has raised questions about efforts to justify the regulation of hate speech, or campaign finance, in light of the equality principles of later amendments, in part because he suggests that there is no
principled way in which to accommodate claims of liberty as against
claims of equality. 122 I will argue in this section that there are principled
reasons to think that equality norms must be reconciled with our understandings of earlier guarantees of liberty; that both values can be accommodated through reasoned judicial decision-making; and that Fiss's
alternative conception, grounded wholly within the First Amendment
itself, does not avoid so much as submerge the problem of equality in
free speech law.
A.

R.A.V. and Hate Speech

First Amendment free speech doctrine both strongly incorporates
norms of equality in some areas of law (including its ideas of content
and viewpoint neutrality), and it strongly rejects them in others (Buckley
being one example, and R.A. V. another). In resolving the hate speech
issue in R.A. V., the Court appeared to give short shrift to equality as
compared to free speech values when it found the state's asserted inter-

est in "ensur[ing] the basic human rights of members of groups that have
historically been subjected to discrimination" insufficient to uphold the
ordinance and expressed doubt that the ordinance was intended for that
purpose. 2 3 The demands of holistic interpretation are that jurists con121. See generally Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 7-30, 33-66, 90-120; Fiss,
IRONY, supra note 8, at 27-28.
122. See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 15.
123. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (suggesting that a "content
neutral" law could protect against harm to members of such groups and that the real purpose of the
law was to express special official hostility to particular biases that, the Court said, the First
Amendment forbids); see also id. at 383-85 (arguing that "fighting words" may have expressive
content worthy of protection). The St. Paul statute prohibited the display of, inter alia, symbols
such as a burning cross, or Nazi swastika, that "arouse[ ] anger, alarm or resentment" based on
"race, color, creed, religion or gender" and had been construed by the state court to extend only to
"fighting words." See id at 381. The Court's apparent willingness to treat the expressions
prohibited by the ordinance (as construed by the state court) as having some possible value,
coupled with its failure to give serious weight to the harms to human equality from such acts,
suggests that the First Amendment's protection of speech was treated in this context as more
significant that the Fourteenth Amendment's equality of persons commitments. For a vivid
anecdote about the "firstness" of the First Amendment and the subordinate role of the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause, see Lawrence, supra note 61, at 473-74, describing an
account by john powell:
My family was having Thanksgiving dinner at the home of friends. We are
vegetarians and my two kids were trying to figure out which of the two dressings on
the table was the vegetarian dressing and which was the meat dressing. One of our
hosts pointed to one of the dressings and said, "This is the regular dressing and the
other is the vegetarian dressing." I corrected him saying, 'There is no such thing as
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sider how the First Amendment could and should be re-read in light of
the Fourteenth, at least as one part of the analysis.
Fiss's argument - that the First Amendment should be read to
protect a social condition in which many voices can be heard and thus as
warranting some forms of regulation - is one evocative of readings of
expressive freedoms given elsewhere in the world under post World War
II constitutions. 124 Fiss does not as explicitly invoke the constitutional
experience of other nations in support of his First Amendment views, as
do such First Amendment kindred spirits as Cass Sunstein.12 5 Speculating, I wonder if this is because Fiss is committed at some level to the
proposition that the First Amendment is first, 26 a commitment at work
in his heroic efforts to ground within the First Amendment commitment
to "liberty,"'' 27 or to the social condition of "freedom of speech," argu'regular' dressing. There is meat dressing and there is vegetarian dressing, but
neither one of them is regular dressing."
This incident reminded john of the discussions he has had with his colleagues on the subject of
regulating racist speech. "Somehow," he said, "I always come away from these discussions
feeling that my white colleagues think about the first amendment the way my friend thought about
"regular" [meat] dressing, as an amendment for regular people or all people, and that they think of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment the way my friend thought about
vegetarian dressing, as a special amendment for a minority of different people."
124. See, e.g., The Television Cases, 12 BverfGE 205 (1961) 9, excerpted and translated in
KOMMERS, supra note 96, at 404. The German court observed that Article 5 of the German Basic
Law, which protects an individual's rights "freely to express himself' as well as press freedoms,
"requires that [television broadcasting, a] modem instrument of opinion formation should be
neither at the mercy of the state nor [at the mercy of] one single social group." It therefore
invalidated a federal statute organizing a public television station on the grounds that it had to
require more diversity of control over the broadcasting decisions in the structure of the station's
control. Id. at 405. In a number of German cases, the idea of the government's affirmative
obligation to act so as to guarantee "every individual . ..the highest level of freedoms and of
possibilities in the media" is expressed. KoMMERS, supra note 96, at 407 (quoting in part a
Bundestag report). This affirmative conception comes through even more clearly in Television Il
Case (1981), 57 BverfGE 295, excerpted and translated in KOMMERS, supra note 96, at 409:
[M]ere freedom from governmental influence does not by itself imply that the
broadcasting [industry] can freely engage in the comprehensive shaping of opinion
making; defensive regulation alone cannot accomplish this task. Rather, [the
accomplishment] of this task requires that a system be created to ensure that the
diversity of existing opinions finds its greatest possible breadth and completeness
through broadcasting, and that, as a consequence, comprehensive information will
be offered to the public.
125. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 77-79.
126. See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 12 (attributing this view to some "participants in the
current debate" who would "resolve the conflict between liberty and equality in favor of liberty:
the First Amendment should be first, they argue"). At this point Fiss seems to be positioning
himself in between this view and the view of others that equality concerns trump liberty. Id. at
12-13. Elsewhere, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 116, he describes R.A. V. as turning on
the idea that "[t]he First Amendment is first" and then writes: "It might be possible, at least for
purposes of argument, to allow Justice Scalia still his major premise - assume the firstness of the
First Amendment - and still find the partiality of the St. Paul regulation acceptable."
127. See supra note 110 (noting Fiss' identification of conflict between liberty and equality).
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ments for a more activist ("friendly") state that might be able to prohibit
hate speech and pornography, and limit campaign expenditures as well
as contributions. Although his argument from within the First Amend-

ment has much attraction, on some issues, including hate speech, his
argument does not in fact avoid the need to deal with tensions between

freedom of speech and values of the equal dignity of each human being
in the polity.
As noted above, Professor Fiss has urged that because some governmental interventions can be seen as increasing speech, they may thus
be seen as consistent with First Amendment values. On campaign
finance, he has suggested that limiting expenditures is necessary in order
to avoid the kind of "drowning out" of the voices of the less well
financed that, in the setting of a town hall meeting, would be performed
by the parliamentarian. 12 8 Applying this insight to the problem of "hate
speech," he characterizes R.A.V. as resting on the idea that the "First
Amendment is first" among constitutional values' 2 9 but argues that
R.A. V. could be resolved in a way that avoids positing a conflict between
liberty and equality if the anti-cross burning statute there were seen
instead as a protection of the freedom of speech of its targets - so it
would be supported by internal free speech values. 13 Although I recognize the elegant appeal of this argument, the problem is that the "silencing" effects of hate speech on individual victims are not what are so
uniquely offensive about hate speech, for there are many forms of
speech (including insults to one's intelligence, or other highly critical
13
personal attacks) that also may be "silencing" for the victims. '
But note that as Fiss constructs it elsewhere, freedom of speech is not about "liberty" in the sense
of individual autonomy but about a social condition of a robust marketplace of ideas. (I think Fiss
undervalues the autonomy-protecting aspects of the First Amendment, but let me put that to the
side for now.) For Fiss, then, the First Amendment is not so much a "negative liberty" but a form
of positive welfare right, obligating the government to act on behalf of a particular social
condition. The implications of this might well be that an action should lie to compel the
government to act to fulfill its obligation for this social condition. In some modem constitutions
(Ireland, India) positive rights are established as nonjusticiable directive principles. For
constitutional textualists, the negative, prohibitory language of the First Amendment might
support a more constrained reading here of the nature of any justiciable rights to compel
government regulation.
128. See Fiss, LIBERALIsM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 5-6, 19, 22, 26-27, 102-03, 118-19; see
also, Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2479-81 (1997); Fiss, IRONY,
supra note 8, at 28. For a critique of the basic model of the "parliamentarian," see Robert Post,
Equality and Autonomy in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,95 MIcH. L. REV. 1517, 1528, 1530-

34 (1997) (reviewing

Fiss, LiBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY
(1996)) (arguing that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to
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assume the kind of agenda that parliamentary model requires).
129. See supra note 60 (on the firstness of the First Amendment).
130. See Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 118-19; see also Owen M Fiss, The
Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 281 (1995).
131. See sources cited supra note 111. Fiss argues for a form of sociological understanding
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As noted earlier, Fiss has concerns (or is at least somewhat ambivalent) about efforts to justify hate speech regulation in terms of the equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He suggests that such an
explanation rests on the idea that because racial equality is favored by
the Constitution, it is permissible for the government not to be neutral on
the issue and thus to sanction government suppression of ideas contrary
to those embodied in the Constitution. As Fiss articulates what he
describes as a "strong view" of the First Amendment, "Everything
should be up for grabs, even fundamental principles."' 3 2 He also is concerned whether there is any principled way to choose between equality
and liberty, making the position of the defenders of the statute in R.A. V.
133
on equality grounds "no more secure in their premises" than Scalia.
Yet he also criticizes the Court in R.A. V. for not giving more consideration to the Fourteenth Amendment's equality value to "tip the scale" in
favor of the statute, even if it could not be sustained wholly within the
1 34
terms of the First Amendment.
The main thrust of Fiss's argument, however, is that First Amendment freedoms should be understood internally to guarantee a positive
social condition of "freedom of speech" and thus to warrant the government in enacting regulations that redistribute private power over speech
to achieve a more robust public discourse. And on his view of cross
burning as not only insulting but silencing, he seeks to justify the statute
within the terms of First Amendment freedom, not as advancing the
cause of equality (even if this was what motivated it), 13 5 but as an effort
to protect the integrity, the robustness, of public debate. But I fear that
Fiss's own deep commitments to freedom of speech and to government
neutrality as between positions in the robust marketplace of ideas, on the
one hand, and to equality for subordinate groups, on the other hand,
cannot so readily be reconciled.
about silencing, an understanding deeply connected to social inequality. See Fiss, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 119 (arguing that if "the speech is aimed at someone who would not be
silenced, as indeed might be the case if the target is not a member of a disadvantaged group,"
application of hate speech statute would be unconstitutional in such a case).
132. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 115.
133. Id. at 1116.
134. Fiss, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 26.
135. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 119 (acknowledging that cross burning statute
might have been motivated by concern for impact of this activity on social standing of minority
groups but that "what is crucial for constitutional analysis is not the actual motive, but the possible
justifications"). I am not sure this is an accurate description of the Court's approach in First
Amendment cases, which at least some scholars think have constructed doctrine designed to
provide particularly stringent scrutiny to government action that is likely to be motivated by a
desire to suppress speech of particular viewpoints or on particular subjects. See, e.g., Elena
Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan,
and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 29, 38-44.
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First, the more thoroughly condemned particular speech acts are,
the more likely it will be that prohibitory legislation could be enacted.
But the very circumstances that give. rise to the enactment might suggest
that the defect with the condemned speech is not its silencing of the
viewpoints of its victims - viewpoints expressed in the existence of
statutes condemning hate speech - but rather the defect is its infliction
of humiliation, degradation and diminishment of their sense of equality
as citizens and human beings. 136 Second, Fiss's theory of government
intervention on behalf of the equal speech rights of subordinated groups
might be used to support suppression not only of "fighting words" but
also of more civil arguments for racist or sexist ideologies or arguments
against the tenets of minority religious groups. 137 However, I think it is
clear that he would not take this theory that far and that his defense of a
possible different result in R.A. V. was limited to the context of "fighting
words." But to the extent that racist speech has "silencing" effects, the
degree of silencing - for example, of causing some members of the
group to refrain from calling attention to themselves by speech - is
likely to be affected by the pervasiveness of more "civilized" forms of
the expression as well as by the more obvious descent into invective.
Yet as the regulatable area of racist speech or arguably racist speech
becomes larger, the threat to many First Amendment values - not only
of individual autonomy but also of the search for better knowledge and
38
the need for robust political challenge and discourse - may increase.
Third, Fiss's apparent willingness to ignore the actual purpose
motivating legislation is in some tension with understandings of the First
Amendment as being particularly concerned with government action that
is motivated by a desire to suppress speech because of the ideas embodied in the speech. 139 If one were to construct a jurisprudence based on
136. Cf. Post, supra note 128, at 1532-33 (1997) (asserting that "even a modest review of the
national media or academic publications" makes implausible any claim that "the silencing effects
of pornography and hate speech produce systematic distortions in public discourse").
137. See id. at 1519. Fiss's account also raises the possibility within a free speech paradigm
that the presence of hate speech regulation chills or silences other speech, both by members of
protected groups and others.
138. Likewise affected might be the system's capacity to engender habits of tolerance. See Lee
C. Bollinger, THE TOLERANT SoCIErY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA
(1986).
139. That is, if a legislature intends not to increase the freedom of speech for members of
minority groups but rather to discourage expression of racist ideas or to advance the substantive
social equality of discriminated against groups, Fiss, as I understand him, would nonetheless
uphold the regulation if an independent adjudicator found that its effect would be to increase
speech opportunities for minority group members. See Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8,
at 123. Although Fiss has framed the primary purpose of the First Amendment as promoting
robust expression in pursuit of self-government (rather than as primarily concerned with
preventing self-interested behavior by existing governments or majorities from stifling discourse),
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analysis of what groups would be particularly silenced by group-based
aspersions, one might want legislative involvement in such a complex
inquiry. Yet if the judicial doctrine is unconcerned with what the legislature's actual purpose is, how likely is it that legislatures will have carefully considered whether one group rather than another needs the
extraordinary protection of speech suppression in order to facilitate their
speech? As Fiss recognizes, his argument depends on "specific facts
and context," turning on "a judgment as to whether the speech that is
being regulated has a silencing effect and whether the robustness of public debate will be advanced by the state choosing the side that it
does."' 4 ° To the extent that this finding does depend on social facts,
legislatures might be thought to have either special competence, or as
much competence, as courts and thus one might want to craft doctrine in
such a way as to ensure that some legislative attention was devoted to
this.
Finally (and for my purposes most important): If the "silencing
effect of words do not depend simply on their context but also on the
social standing of those who hear them," '' then the temptation to
engage in backdoor equality work in service of the First Amendment is
likely to be large indeed for both legislatures and courts. If a group's
social status is subordinated, will it not ipso follow that hate speech
directed their way will be deemed to be "silencing"?142 But if the
inquiry into "silencing" is really an inquiry into subordination, it is hard
to see how Fiss-ian freedom under the First Amendment is not also
"really" about the state's positive duty to "equally protect" its members.
Put another way, the social and political degradation of a group will in
some ways always have a range of effects across many areas including
communications and expression. These "secondary effects" of regimes
of subordination, in Fiss's view, justify regulation of speech because it
can be said that the regulation is in service of more robust speech.
Reliance on the positive secondary speech effects of a suppression
he also believes that interventions should not be designed to suppress communication of ideas but
to increase the range of ideas in public discourse. See id. at 59-66.
140. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 8, at 119.
141. Id.
142. It is at times unclear in Fiss's account whether the silencing effect is to be determined
based on the particular individual victims involved or on the group of which they are a member,
though I think he generally means the latter. Note that an individual who reports and protests such
hate speech, but then also moves out of the neighborhood, has not been "silenced" but has been
socially degraded in that he/she was harassed out of his/her chosen residence. If the inquiry is not
done on a group basis, it is almost impossible to imagine how one could administer the scheme; if
it is, then it seems likely that the question of subordination will be central to the question of
silencing. But if it is sufficient to say that a socially degraded group member's speech will not be
heard with the attention it would if the group were not subordinate, then the inquiry actually seems
to depend more on "equality" concerns than on speech concerns.
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of speech is an awfully blunt blade without some further limitation of
the scope of its force. For example, permitting speakers in town squares
(Kalven's paradigm) might drive some people out of the square - people for whom the shouting harangue creates an unpleasant environment
for the exercise of "robust" but quiet speech about politics. Would we
increase the "freedom of speech" overall by prohibiting speech corner
haranguers? If the question were to be answered sociologically, we
would need to know how many people would be attracted into more
political speech by the street corner speaker than would be repelled. But
surely that should not be the measure of the street corner speakers'
rights, nor is it what is motivating Fiss's argument. Rather, I think
Fiss's argument is motivated by conditions of group subordination, conditions that seem more fundamentally the province of our commitment
to equality than our commitment to free speech, and conditions that provide more coherent limitations on the Fiss-ian argument for government
regulation of speech.
So while I applaud Fiss's effort to invigorate the idea of freedom of
speech within a doctrinal framework for government interventions on
behalf of more freedom of speech, I do not think that his framework can
be made to work without underlying commitments to the social and
political equality of groups, commitments I share but which are far more
integrally tied up with equality norms than with freedom of speech.
Candor and clarity of analysis will be better served by more openly
bringing into tension and balance these deep constitutional commitments
- to freedom of speech and to human equality. And it may be (in part)
the chronological "firstness" of the First Amendment that prevents us
from seeing how to accomplish this balancing.
In order to give appropriate weight to freedom of speech and the
equality of national citizenship in resolving the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting forms of "hate speech," I see no real escape from an
inquiry into the relative value of the speech that the state seeks to prohibit in the interests of racial equality and the context in which the regulation arises. Given risks of censorship, confining allowable regulation
to "fighting words" or "personally insulting invective" may well be necessary in order to avoid suppression of arguably legitimate inquiry and
political dialogue. But within the confines of "fighting words" and
invective - that is, words designed to provoke a violent (or, I would
argue, incapacitated) reaction by its addressees in a context unlikely to
allow, invite or even contemplate a reasoned response' 43 - an appropri143. For reasons developed in feminist and critical race literature, a definition that focuses too
narrowly on words' propensities to provoke violence from particular addressees may fail to
include speech of equally low value and equivalent capacity for social harm that incapacitates its
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ate balance of equality and free speech norms might well support a different judgment on the First Amendment question than that to which a
majority of the Court came in R.A. V. "I
The importance of a contextualized analysis helps explain why
some of the reasoning in R.A.V. is so inapposite. Justice Scalia analogizes the St. Paul hate speech law to an obscenity statute that applied
only to anti-government comments.' 4 5 Discrimination in punishing
obscenity, or hate speech, based on whether the victim was anti-govern-

ment, or Democrat or Republican, is directly contrary to the "checking"
function of elections and the freedom of political speech that virtually all
agree the First Amendment protects.' 4 6 Justice White says such a rule
would "unquestionably fail" equal protection rationality problem.' 47
But there is nothing irrational about a government in power seeking to
suppress criticism of its policies - the problem is that the "end" is illegitimate, and it is illegitimate because allowing a government in power
to take such action interferes with the ability of the electoral process to
perform its checking and legitimating functions. Thus, the most direct
problem with such a statute is that it interferes with the legitimate basis
of government - freedom of people to criticize their governors and
make different choices in the next election. Even if the Constitution had
neither a First Amendment nor an Equal Protection Clause, a constitutional court in a representative democracy would (and should) strike
48
down such a statute.1
immediate addresses through paralyzing shock, humiliation and incapacity to speak. See, e.g.,
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassmentand the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 517, 561-63 (1993); Lawrence, supra note 61, at 458-66; Mari Matsuda, When the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousnessas JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 7, 910 (1989); Note: The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its
Internment, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1129, 1133-34 (1993).
144. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). This Essay does not address nor seek to
resolve all of the First Amendment issues presented by the St. Paul ordinance, including those
addressed in Justice White's concurring opinion. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397, 411-14 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (finding the ordinance overbroad and hence unconstitutional under
the First Amendment). A full treatment might also need to consider whether institutional factors,
such as the decentralized character of U.S. judicial review, see infra text accompanying notes 20106, 219, bear on the correct resolution of the constitutionality of such an ordinance.
145. Id. at 384 (upholding the hate speech prohibition there at issue would "mean that a city
council could enact an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain
criticism of the city government or, indeed, that do not include endorsement of the city
government. Such a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is at
odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence as well.").
146. In an earlier piece, I have characterized the constitutional functions of elections as
checking those already in power, choosing members of the government, and legitimating the
governing capacities of those so chosen. See Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and
Structural Reasoning, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 299.
147. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 406 (White, J., concurring).
148. See Jackson, supra note 35, at 310-27.
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A statute that protects members of subordinated minority groups
from invective based on their group status, in a sufficiently narrowly
crafted statute, however, does not on its face single out speech based on

whether it is pro- or anti-government, nor does it bear any significant
risk of suppressing anti-government criticism. It imposes only a small
limit on the exchange of ideas. It may contribute (a question of constitutional significance would be how significantly) to the ability of members
of those groups to function on terms and with a sense of equality toward
other members of the polity.14 9 If such a statute were to be justified, it
seems to me that it must rise or fall on the norm of equality (not "silencing"): People's right to be protected from subordination based on their
race, gender, or religion, should not depend on whether they have something to say; it should depend on their being human beings.15 °
How does a constitutional court make law in accommodating, rec-

onciling or harmonizing values of equality and values of freedom of
expression? There are a number of approaches, in addition to the categorical rule-based approach to freedom of expression used in the United
States. For example, in Canada, and in a number of other constitutional

systems, a basic tool of constitutional analysis is "proportionality."11552'
Consider the Canadian Supreme Court's analysis in R. v. Keegstra,
which begins with all of the Justices in agreement that the challenged

149. A key point as well would be how narrowly drafted a "hate speech" statute is, because of
the evident risks of deterring protected speech and of misuse of a loosely drafted statute. One
possibility would be to follow Professor Fiss's lead and permit the restriction of hate speech
directed at any group subordinated on the basis of categories that are constitutionally suspectincluding race, religion, creed, gender, and (perhaps by now) sexual orientation. A different
possibility is to follow what I take to be Germany's model on the Holocaust denial, and ground
doctrine upholding hate speech directed against African-Americans in the unique national shame
of slavery. There is a more than plausible basis for upholding more vigorous rules prohibiting
hate speech directed at African-Americans, as remnants or "badges" of slavery. Cf. Amar, supra
note 40, at 157 (suggesting Thirteenth Amendment basis to uphold state prosecution in R.A.V.).
But it is not my purpose here to resolve either the issue in R.A. V. or to design a constitutional hate
speech statute, but rather to suggest that it may not be necessary in the United States to avoid
constitutional analysis that frankly acknowledges the equality interest at stake.
150. In Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003), the Court upheld in part a Virginia law that
made it a criminal offense to burn a cross with intent to intimidate. In these opinions, the
relationship between cross burning and racial violence was accepted as a historically sound basis
for the statute's specifically singling out one form of symbolic expression as also closely
associated with threats of violence.
151. On its use elsewhere, including Germany, and for preliminary consideration of its
attractions and risks in the United States, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality,"Rights and
Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583 (1999); Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae:
What Might Have Been the Second Germanization ofAmerican Equal ProtectionReview, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 284 (1998). I use Canada here because it is highly accessible and in English.
152. [1990] 3 S.C. R. 697 (Supreme Court of Canada) (upholding conviction of anti-Semitic
high school teacher who required students to parrot his views, under law prohibiting "willful
promotion of hatred" against identifiable groups through non private communication).
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statute infringed the "freedom of expression" secured by Charter section
2.153 A question then arises under the Canadian Charter whether the
statute's restriction was reasonable and "demonstrably justified in a free

and democratic society." '54 This question, in turn, has two major components. The first asks whether the goal of the statute is itself consistent
with Charter values and of "sufficient importance" to warrant some

infringement on Charter rights. The court was also unanimous in concluding that the statute's goal was legitimate and of sufficient importance to warrant infringement of Charter rights. 55 The final phase of
analysis is referred to as a three-step "proportionality" analysis. First, it
asks whether the statute "rationally" fostered its legitimate goal. On
this, the Keegstra court was again in agreement that it did so. 1 56 The
disagreement arose in applying the other elements of proportionality
analysis. Does the law "impair as little as possible," or as little as reasonably possible, the right or freedom in question,' 57 a question that
incorporates a "margin of appreciation." ' 8 The Justices in Keegstra
divided on this point, and on the final question of the "proportionality
between the effects of the [challenged] measures . . .and the objective
which has been identified as of 'sufficient' importance." '5 9 This
inquiry, the Canadian court has said, includes an attempt to determine
153. Constitution Act, 1982 (Can.), pt. 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 2.
154. Id. § 1.
155. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 758, 787 (Dickson, J.); id. at 846-48 (McLachlin, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 812 (McLachlin, J., dissenting). The majority specifically noted that eradicating racial
and religiously based hatred was consistent with the Charter's goal of equality, under section 15
(which prohibits discrimination by the government and specifically preserves the government's
authority to provide for affirmative action programs) and Charter section 27, which provides that
the Charter "shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of
the multicultural heritage of Canadians." Id. at 756-58. These two provisions in the Canadian
Charter are quite different from anything in the U.S. Constitution. Arguably, they provide a
firmer textual basis for the court's conclusion in Keegstra (though not in the judgment of the
Canadian dissenters).
156. It is not clear that the minimal rationality step in practice plays a role independent of the
"legitimate and sufficiently important objective" inquiry other than to screen statutes so poorly
designed to achieve a particular goal as to raise doubts whether the objective was actually
intended.
157. See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 846, relying on R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 139; see also R.
v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 772-73 (Dickson, C.J.) (asking whether
challenged law abridges protected freedom "as little as is reasonably possible," and considering
whether there is some "reasonable alternative scheme" that would allow the province to achieve
its goals with fewer detrimental effects on religious freedom). Cf Paul Horowitz, The Sources
and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond, 54 UNIv.
TORoNro FACuLTY L. REv. 1, 34 (1996) (treating Edwards Books as a relaxation of Oakes's
minimal impairment standard).
158. Irwin Toy Ltd v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 999. The margin of appreciation, it
has been argued, helps to avoid the difficulties of a U.S. style "least drastic means" test, given that
it is often possible to imagine a "less drastic means." See Hoc, supra note 109, at § 35.11 (b).
159. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139.
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the "proportionality between the deleterious and the salutary effects of
1 60
the measures."
The core of the disagreement was over the beneficial effects of a
hate speech law in promoting equality and the potential adverse effects
on protected speech. The dissent was concerned that the effects of hate
speech laws and prosecutions might be to glamorize the hatemongers in
the eyes of the public (noting the inefficacy of hate speech prosecutions
in Weimar Germany); 1 6 1 the dissent noted as well instances of overbroad
and inappropriate application of the laws by executive branch officials. 16 2 The majority, however, concluded that the hate speech prohibi-

tion was likely to be efficacious in expressing severe disapproval of the
conduct, thereby providing support to victims and expressing to the rest
of Canada the need to condemn and avoid such conduct. 16 3 The hate
speech statute was a "means by which the values beneficial to a free and
democratic society can be publicized."'" In response to the dissent's
concern that the statute would result in the prosecution (and deterrence)
of protected speech, the majority emphasized the mens rea requirement
of willfulness, the limitation of the statute to public speech, and the
availability of statutory defenses, including defenses of good faith or
reasonable belief. 165 The majority noted with concern specific incidents
relied on by the dissent to show the overbroad nature of the statute, but
forcefully said that these were mistakes. 166 The majority acknowledged
that "one of the strongest arguments" against upholding the hate speech

statute was that a criminal prohibition was not necessary to accomplish
the government's legitimate ends.' 67 Recognizing that there were other
160. Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] S.C.R. 835, 889. I want to note here my debt to Professor
Hogg's treatise for its helpful summary of the Canadian case law on which I relied in significant
measure in writing the above paragraph. See Hock, supra note 109, at §§ 35.8-35.12.
161. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 854 (McLachlin, J. dissenting).
162. Id. at 859 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
163. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 769-70.
164. Id. at 769.
165. Defenses include truth, or that the defendant "in good faith, expressed or attempted to
establish by argument an opinion on a religious subject; [or] (c) if the statements were relevant to
any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on
reasonable grounds he believed them to be true." Id. at 715-16.
166. "That s. 319(2) may in the past have led authorities to restrict expression offering valuable
contributions to the arts, education or politics in Canada is surely worrying. I hope, however, that
my comments as to the scope of the provision make it obvious that only the most intentionally
extreme forms of expression will find a place within s. 319(2). In this light, one can safely say
that the incidents mentioned above illustrate not over-expansive breadth and vagueness in the law,
but rather actions by the state which cannot be lawfully taken pursuant to s. 319(2). The
possibility of illegal police harassment clearly has minimal bearing on the proportionality of hate
propaganda legislation to legitimate Parliamentary objectives, and hence the argument based on
such harassment can be rejected." Id. at 783.
167. Id. at 783-84.
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ways in which condemnation and support could be shown, the court said
that the proportionality test should not be read to make impermissible
use of a strong means merely because less intrusive means were available, and concluded that the standard of "minimal impairment" was met
because:
[T]here may equally be circumstances in which the more confrontational response of criminal prosecution is best suited to punish a
recalcitrant hate-monger. To send out a strong message of condemnation, both reinforcing the values underlying s. 319(2) and deterring
the few individuals who would harm target group members and the
propaganda,
larger community by intentionally communicating16 hate
8
will occasionally require use of the criminal law.
I have discussed these opinions in Keegstra as an illustration of
how a different kind of analysis might take place, one that candidly
seeks to reconcile competing constitutional values under the discipline
of a set of questions that require judgments of relative harms and benefits, in which a categorization of both the speech and the regulation
plays a part - but only a part - in the analysis. I find much of value in
both sides in Keegstra. Indeed, the majority's emphasis on the efficacy
of a criminal statute in publicizing the government's disapproval of hate
motivated speech suggests that, in thinking about how to reconcile free
speech with equality, more government speech against hate speech
would be an important (and perhaps better, because less liberty restricting) alternative, to the criminal prohibition. If the government's purpose
is to provide support for victims and educate the public about the dangers of such speech, part of the proportionality analysis might well look
at the efficacy of government speech, as compared to government prohibition of private speech, toward these ends. 169 Condemnation by indi168. See id. at 785. An American lawyer's reaction to these forms of reasoning might be that

the discussion was not about law but about policy. A Canadian sympathetic to the court's
jurisprudence might respond that the discussion concerned disagreement about the implementation
of constitutional values. In the end, through a "proportionality" analysis, the court clearly upheld
the statute and the conviction of a hatemongering public-school teacher who taught his students to
repeat anti-Semitic dogma in their school work. In a later case, the court made clear that the
limitations on government suppression of hate speech embedded in proportionality analysis had
some force. In Attis v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (Can.), the court was faced with noncriminal, administrative sanction of a school teacher who, off duty, circulated pamphlets arguing
that "Christian civilization was being undermined and destroyed by an international Jewish
conspiracy." Id. at 836-37. The court upheld a disciplinary order that the teacher be moved out of
the classroom to an administrative posting, but held that it violated the Charter to prohibit the
teacher permanently from circulating such materials while still a school employee.
169. Many scholars have concluded that government funding of one-sided speech is
permissible on relatively uncontroversial subjects. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 229-31;
Kagan, supra note 135, at 75 (suggesting permissibility of government funding of speech on one
side of an issue, where the question has a verifiable answer, the harm associated with the position
the government opposes is great and there is a substantial consensus on the issue); Robert C. Post,
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vidual government officials or even by government bodies of hate
speech might be practices that Owen Fiss might call "constitutionally
favored," 70 or that I might call "pro-constitutional."''
Also noteworthy is the Canadian jurisprudence's sensitivity to the nature of the remedy, a sensitivity often lacking in U.S. decisions. 7 2 Thus, in Attis v.
Board of School Trustees, 173 the Canadian court held that an employee
could be removed from a teaching position and reassigned in light of his
off-duty, anti-Semitic speech, but he could not be barred from speech for
the duration of his government employ, the latter sanction being disproportional. This more fine-tuned approach seems at least to attempt to
give weight both to the equality interests sought to be served by prohibitions of hate speech and to the free expression interests of the speaker.
My goal here is not to decide the constitutionality of particular hate
speech prohibitions but rather to suggest that U.S. constitutional decisions on this problem should more frankly engage the constitutional
interests in equality that are entailed and acknowledge the difficulty of
the problem of reconciling freedom of expression with constitutionally
sanctioned efforts to promote racial and other forms of equality. In
these respects, the Court's opinion in R.A. V. failed. Whether to sustain
regulation of hate speech is a difficult question, I think, no matter what
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 186-87 (1996) (approving funding limitations based on
"shared values" but not those that are more partisan). Fiss's view would differ, I think, since he
has argued that funding allocation decisions, e.g., in the arts, should be made based on criteria to
increase exposure to relatively less popular or available ideas. Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 44-45.
For yet another view, see Abner Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1667 (2001); Abner Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2000) (arguing
that government may use funds to advocate particular vision of the good, even if controversial, so
long as government does not monopolize debate or hide true source of messages).
170. Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 48-49 (describing the "constitutionally favored" as "an
intermediate category lying between the permissible and the obligatory").
171. See Jackson, The Invisible Constitution (Apr. 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
172. But cf Nike, Inc. v. Krasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567-68 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted) (arguing that allocation of private attorney
general power distinctively threatens First Amendment values). I should note that Fiss has argued
that, for First Amendment purposes, distinctions between criminal sanctions and allocative
decisions are for the most part not relevant. Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 34-35 (discussing arts
funding and suggesting that both nonallocation and prohibition are "silencing" of disfavored
speech). I disagree. U.S. First Amendment law will, I think, need to develop a more
contextualized approach, perhaps embracing "proportionality" analysis, in order to accommodate
itself to a world information economy that is unconstrained by national boundaries and in which
the facilities of copying, aggregating, and disseminating information is so much greater than in the
past, see, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Web Site Causes Unease in Police, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 2003, at
A12 (describing concern over publication of names, addresses and Social Security numbers of
police officers), that the costs of more categorical approaches will become unsustainable. See
Vicki C. Jackson, Proportionalityand the Constitution (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
173. [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (Can.). See supra note 168.
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system of analysis is used. In light of the possible efficacy of more
government speech in opposition, and the risks of misuse of prohibitory

statutes,174 there is a real question whether criminal prohibitions can be
justified; they are a very powerful tool to place in government hands.
On the other hand, hate speech is not only of very low value in terms of

any plausible First Amendment interests, but it also inflicts high injuries
to the equal human dignity of its victims. The First Amendment's
capacity to protect dissent and disagreement may not be well served by
expanding the scope of its coverage to areas of very low value speech,
like racial insults.
In Virginia v. Black,1 75 the issue was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting cross burning in public places or on another's property

without consent, with the intent to intimidate a person or group of persons; the statute also made burning a cross "prima facie" evidence of an
intent to intimidate. Relying on R.A. V., the Virginia Supreme Court
struck down the statute on the ground that it discriminated among
expressive acts based on their content.' 7 6 Although one might have
thought that R.A.V. meant that while all forms of intimidating threats
could be punished, it would be impermissible to single out the burning
of particular items based on their symbolic message, the Court distinguished between the fighting words category at issue in R.A.V. and the
threats of violence to which they found the Virginia statute directed.
The Court reasoned that "true threats"1 77 can be prohibited without vio174. For a claim that prosecutions under hate speech statutes risk being directed at members of
minority groups for hate speech directed against majorities, see Nathan Courtney, British and
United States Hate Speech Legislation:A Comparison, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 727, 738-40, 762-63
(1993) (concluding that Great Britain's racial incitement laws, "though enacted for laudable
reason, have been used to silence those they were seeking to protect"). For reports of attempted
suppression of gay/lesbian literature in Canada under its pornography statute, see Sarah Lyall,
Canada's Morals Police: Serious Books at Risk? N.Y. TumEs, Dec. 13, 1993, at A8; Mary
Williams Walsh, Chill Hits Canada's Porn Law, L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 6 1993, at A]. See also
Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critiqueof "The" Feminist Critiqueof Pornography,79 VA. L. REv.
1099, 1116-20, 1141, 1142-72 (1993).
175. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
176. R.A. V. was a difficult precedent for the petitioners, as illustrated by the following passage
from an amicus brief filed by the Anti-Defamation League et al. on behalf of neither party:
Under the scheme of § 18.2-423, it does not matter what substantive message a
defendant intended to convey by burning a cross. While choosing a symbol that
Americans uniformly view as emblematic of racial and religious hatred, the
legislature did not choose to punish the mere expression of hatred. It rather chose to
punish expression only when it crosses the constitutional line into assaultive speech
and is accompanied by the intent to instill serious fear in those exposed to the
message.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. at *16, Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536
(2003) (No. 01-1107), available at 2002 WL 1870239.
177. Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48. Is there a difference in the degree of harm to be expected
from fighting words - expressive conduct that is likely to provoke violent responses - and
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lating the First Amendment and that, given their historic linkage with
violence, cross burnings could be singled out for prohibition as a particularly virulent example of the very reason that the category of true
threats could be prohibited in the first place. 7 8

Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court manifests an odd ambivalence toward social context and the history of prejudice and violence
against disliked minority groups. On the one hand, the Court reviewed
the history of cross burning and its linkage to Ku Klux Klan violence
against African-Americans, Jews and immigrant groups, and concluded
that the burning cross is "a symbol of hate," apparently to reinforce the
appropriateness of singling out that particular symbol. t79 Yet after
establishing the symbolic message of hatred exhibited by burning a
cross, the Court then proceeded to treat the burning cross as a messageneutral form of intimidation, apparently concluding that the burning
cross was legitimately singled out in the statute, not because of its message of racial and religious inferiority, but simply because of its message
of intended violence.' 8 0 Choosing this one symbol was permissible, the
Court said, because it was a "particularly virulent form of intimidation";
Virginia need not prohibit "all intimidating messages . . . in light of
cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending

violence" -

a history, however, that strongly suggested its association

with a message of racial hatred and subordination.

8

intimidation (expressive conduct that instills fear of violence from the speaker) that would support
a relaxation of First Amendment concerns for content discrimination? Although that is not what
the Court said, in its reference to "true threats" perhaps some comparison with the hate speech
statute in St. Paul was implicit.
178. Id. at 1538, 1549-50. A similar argument, however, could have been made about the
proscribed categories of "fighting words" at issue in RA.V.
179. Id. at 1546. "Hatred," it should be noted, is a feeling typically directed at particular
persons or groups, and the singling out of this particular symbol could be seen to raise issues like
those that concerned the Court in R.A.V. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). At oral argument in Virginia v. Black, Justice Thomas asked counsel,
"Aren't you understating the effects of the burning cross? We had almost 100 years of lynching
...and this was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of that reign of terror" and added that
cross burning is "unlike any symbol in our society." 2002 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 74, at *20-21
(U.S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 11, 2002). In his separate opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the statute
involved no regulation of speech at all, but only of conduct. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1565-66
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 ("It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with
intent to intimidate because of the victim's race, gender, or religion" or political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality.); see also id. at 1564 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a
white family would feel as threatened to see a burning cross on its yard as would a black family).
Although it is surely correct that a burning cross on one's property would properly be understood
as a threat of violence, it also would be understood in the United States as a distinctively
racialized threat.
181. Id. at 1549; see id. at 1544-46. Justice Thomas argued, however, that because the statute
prohibiting cross burnings was originally enacted by the State of Virginia at a time when Virginia
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The majority in Virginia v. Black appears to uphold government
power to prohibit forms of symbolic expression if they are peculiarly
likely to be followed by physical violence and if the government must
also prove that, in light of all the circumstances, the symbolic expression
is intended as a threat.1 82 Despite its recognition of the historical association of the burning cross with violence and intimidation directed at
racial and religious minority groups, the Court did not explicitly link its
analysis of the free speech issue in the case with any governmental interest in promoting equality. 18 3 There was thus a lost opportunity for an
opinion that would acknowledge not only the violence but the harms to
our constitutional commitments to equality that such symbolic expression presents. However, the Court's willingness to consider history and
context in giving meaning to particular symbols and its emphasis on
more individualized, contextualized decision-making in the First
Amendment area are noteworthy departures from R.A. V.'s more categorical rule-based approach, suggesting perhaps some convergence with the
Canadian and German decision-making models described earlier.
B.

Campaign Finance and Speech

Owen Fiss has extended his analysis to a number of important free
speech issues, including campaign finance, which relates to claims for
racial equality (at best) only indirectly. 8 4 But more generally, equality
of participation in the electoral process is in some ways a central problem for the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation. In Buckley,
the Supreme Court asserted that it is not a legitimate end of campaign
finance regulation to increase equality in the electoral process by suprequired the segregation of the races by law, it was plainly not the racism, but the violence
associated with cross burnings, that Virginia was seeking to regulate. Id. at 1565-66 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
182. See id. at 1541, 1547-49. Note the resonances between Justice O'Connor's treatment of
the burning cross - under her analysis for the Court it can be one factor, but not the only factor,
in establishing a threat - and her opinion for the Court in Grutter, in which she held that
universities may consider race, but only as one among many factors to be individually determined,
in admissions. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003). The operation of a more
contextualized balancing approach to difficult constitutional questions is apparent in both of these
decisions.
183. But cf Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting work describing the
Klan's opposition to racial equality). Nor did the Court conclude that cross burning is, in the
United States, like denying the Holocaust - a form of expression that is so inconsistent with the
dignity of a formerly subjugated minority group that commitments to equality for members of that
group in the polity justify a limitation on such "speech."
184. For an argument that the Court's election-related decisions have an adverse impact on
African-American voters, see Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion and
Campaign Finance, 80 TEx. L. REV. 987 (2002); see also Miles Rapoport & Jason Tarricone,
Election Reform's Next Phase: A BroadDemocracy Agenda and the Need for a Movement, 9 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 379, 397-98 (2002).
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pressing the "speech" (i.e., expenditures for political speech) of some to
increase the opportunities for others.18 5 This statement assumes, without
explanation, that the Fourteenth Amendment's commitments to equality
- whose effects are seen in decisions invalidating segregated schools,
whether under federal or state control, or in "one-person, one-vote" decisions applied both to state legislatures and congressional districting do not affect constitutional analysis of speech related to elections. The
question of holistic interpretation is whether Buckley is not mistaken in
viewing First Amendment free speech values as unaffected by our
increased commitment both to the equality of persons generally and to

the centrality of elections conducted in accordance with one-person,
one-vote principles.' 8 6
Elections, unlike many other settings of free speech, take place only
within a structure determined by the government. Fiss's vision of the
state as a "friend" to freedom of expression has particular salience here,
because it is obvious that the government needs to act affirmatively to
facilitate the conduct of elections (an activity that is about both voting
and speech). Campaign finance regulation, even if formally neutral,
may have different effects on political parties or candidates supported by
wealthier individuals than on political parties supported by the less
wealthy, 87 and may also structure how difficult it is for new political
185. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (rejecting argument, made in support of
expenditure limits, of government interest "in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections," because "the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment"). Regulation of campaign finance differs from regulation
of hate speech across important First Amendment categories. Governmental viewpoint and
content neutrality is of utmost importance in elections for political representatives. See e.g., Cook
v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 532 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (obligation of the "state itself'
to remain neutral as to "issues or candidates"). For an elected body, like a city council or the
House of Representatives, to adopt a resolution condemning cross burnings, or racist speech, or to
fund public programs promoting tolerance, is one thing; for a sitting government to endorse or
expend public funds for a particular candidate for office is quite different. Moreover, campaign
finance regulation, even when formally neutral, always presents some possibility for
discrimination, in effect, since it is enacted by a political process that is by definition in the control
of incumbents, a factor that contributes to the difficulty of the constitutional issues such laws
present.
186. Fiss's important argument - that in campaign finance we could see the government as
the "parliamentarian" assuring that all important sides are heard in public debate - does not
necessarily require resort to human equality norms; Not all sides get equal time in the frequently
poly-sided problems dealt with in "town hall" meetings or legislative bodies. But in terms of the
"content" of campaign finance regulation, we need some set of substantive principles to tell us
why we may want to restrict some financing of some speech; a starting point that is
constitutionally grounded lies in the fundamental equality of each person's entitlement to
participate in selecting political leaders through his or her vote.
187. For a range of perspectives on the relationship between wealth, money, markets and
elections, see, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002); Richard Briffault, Point/Counterpoint: Public Funding and
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parties to make a difference. Thus, even were one to accept that promoting equality of participation is a legitimate end of regulation, the interpretive decisions would be difficult.'
As noted above, Canadian constitutional law seems willing to
uphold fairly stringent limitations on independent expenditures (and
party expenditures) in order to prevent "undue" wealth influence and
focus on money raising in elections.' 89 German constitutional law
arguably requires some sensitivity to the wealth effects of different
forms of regulation, in order to avoid adding to the advantages enjoyed
by the wealthier. 19° In both countries, then, it appears to be an accepted
constitutional value that the government can intervene - within impor-

tant limits191 - in order to promote more equal access to political influ192

ence in elections, as well as equal voting power.
Drawing clear conclusions about the constitutionality of particular
Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 573-79 (1999); Edward B. Foley, Equal-DollarPer-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994);
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Pamela Karlan & Samuel Issacharoff,
The Hydraulics of Campaign FinanceReform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705 (1999); Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1998); Jamin Raskin
& John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically
FinancedElections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Wealth
Primary, I,YAE L. & POL'Y REV. 2 (1993).

188. See supra note 185 (on the possibility of partisan discrimination in campaign finance
legislation).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 76-89 (discussing Libman and Bowman cases).
190. See KOMMERS, supra note 94, at 53-54, 201-15 (Party Finance cases); for further
discussion, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Law and the PoliticalProcess,Politics as
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STN. L. REV. 643, 690-97 (1998).

191. The German court has emphasized that public funding cannot be at such a level as to
diminish party incentives to gather financial support from citizens. See KOMMERS, supra note 94,
at 214-15; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 190, at 696-97.
192. Although major restrictions on campaigns and political committees in fundraising,
expenditures and contributions have been recently upheld by the U. S. Court, the Court did so
primarily on the asserted rationales of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, see, e.g.,
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. at 656 (explaining reasons for contributions limits); the Court has
not disavowed its assertion in Buckley that it is not legitimate for the government to seek, through
campaign finance regulation, to equalize opportunities for influence in the political process,
though its commitment to that position may be wavering, see, e.g, Richard Briffault, Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era? 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1729, 1742 (2001) (noting that "to the extent that corruption includes the 'undue influence'
of money over electoral outcomes, then the notion of corruption includes a significant component
that reflects a concern about political inequality" and observing that "decisions after Buckley
reflect the intermittent tendency of 'corruption' to morph into 'inequality"'); see also Rick Hasen,
Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v.

Federal Election Commission, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Public Law and Legal Theory,
Research Paper No. 2004-1 (SSRN) (forthcoming 152 U. PA. L. REV. _ (2004)) (arguing that the
Court is moving toward accepting a participatory self-government rationale for restrictions, as
advocated in extrajudicial writings by Justice Breyer).
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forms of campaign finance and election regulation is quite difficult,' 93
however, and I do not do so here. There are at least three major
problems for which recognition of the value of individual equality in
campaign finance law does not provide ready answers. First, individuals
have very different levels of desire to participate in political activity.
Although each person only has one vote, not everyone votes, and some
individuals may want to volunteer many hours of time to work for a
particular candidate (just as some want to donate large sums of money),
while others may have little or no interest in doing so. And even though
the ability to donate time may be related to income or wealth, a regulatory regime that sought to equalize the impact of the more motivated
with the impact of the less motivated by limiting the amount of time the
more motivated could work on a political campaign could be an unwarranted interference with the liberty of the motivated to be more active.
Second, the Constitution protects not only individual, but collective,
associational efforts to speak on public issues, influence elections, and
run candidates. Allowing aggregation in this way is not only constitutionally guaranteed but also necessary to a vibrant civil society. Aggregation means that some individual voices will be better heard than
others, as some are more effective in aggregating. Crafting regulatory
schemes that provide appropriate space for the exercise of associational
freedoms in the election setting is thus a challenge not solved by mere
invocation of equality as a norm.
Third, a major risk in election-related regulation is the risk of
entrenchment by incumbents, or of major party efforts to exclude minority parties and independents.' 94 If we focus for a moment on some of
the risks of government abuse the First Amendment is called on to protect,19 5 we might say that values of both freedom of expression and commitment to free popular elections caution that those in power may tend
to perpetuate their own opportunities to stay in power, by suppressing
opportunities for challenge. Since campaign finance reform is, in this
country and a number of others, likely to remain under the active control
of legislative decision-making and influence, risks of pro-incumbency
provisions remain high. These risks - that campaign finance schemes
193. There is an extensive scholarly literature on this subject. For recent symposia, see, e.g.,
University of Richmond Symposium on BRUCE AcrKERMAN & IAN AYERS, VOTING WITH
DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE, printed in 37 U. RICH. L. REV. (2003);

Pamela S. Karlan, Brennan Center Jorde Symposium on Constitutional Law: Elections and
Change Under Voting with Dollars, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 705 (2003); Symposium, Baker v. Carr, A
Commemorative Symposium, 79 N.C. L. REV. (2001); see also supra note 187.
194. See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 174, at 688-89.
195. For helpful treatments, see, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Function in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 521; T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of
Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519, 534-40 (1978-79).
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will be designed by those currently holding power and likely to be calculated to keep them in power - warrant some form of stringent review to
make sure that results are opening up, and not closing down, political
processes.' 96 Thus, even were the Court to retreat from the Buckley
position that equality is not a reason for regulation of campaign contributions, resolution of the appropriate limits to campaign regulation will
be a difficult problem under any constitutional system committed to
freedom of expression and free, fair and competitive voting.
IV.

INSTITUTIONAL ROLES: WHEN JUDGES ARE ELECTED

The Court's 2001-02 Term involved another First Amendment
issue raising institutional questions about the role of courts that implicates another longstanding concern of Owen Fiss's scholarship. In
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 197 the Court struck down
restrictions on the speech of candidates for judicial office that prohibited
such candidates from stating their views on specific nonfanciful legal
questions within the province of the court for which the candidate stood
for election. The majority emphasized the importance of unfettered candidate speech in elections, relying on cases involving election for representative or executive office.' 9 8 Although states need not use elections
to choose judges, once a state decides to invoke the "energy and . . .
legitimizing power" of an election, it must uphold the "First Amendment
rights that attach to [the] roles" of candidate for public office. 199 This
decision brings into focus two constitutional questions: The first concerns the institutional structure of the courts that decide constitutional
questions; the second has to do with the role of categories in First
Amendment law.
It is important to recognize the range of judges and juridical bodies
in the United States that can decide constitutional questions, including
those going to freedom of expression. Reliance on popularly elected
judges is unusual (almost unheard of) in other Western constitutional
democracies." ° Moreover, the United States is a populous country with
196. See, e.g., Missouri v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (Breyer, J., concurring )
(arguing that Court should not defer to legislative approaches that "significantly increase[el the
reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulat[e] legislators
from effective electoral challenge").
197. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
198. See id. at 781-82, 783.
199. Id. at 788 (quoting Justice Marshall's dissent in Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349

(1991)).
200. See Roy A. Schotland, FinancingJudicialElections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001
L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 851 n. 9 (2001) ("The United States is all but alone in having judges
stand for election;" noting that in some Swiss cantons and a few French municipalities judges are
elected); see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:265

many judges. Not only is the corps of judges considerably larger than in
either Germany or Canada,2 1 but the jurisdiction of these courts is different. In Germany, only the Constitutional Court has the power to
declare a law unconstitutional. In Canada, the Supreme Court's power
of review over the provincial courts is greater than in the United States
because of the Canadian court's authority to decide not only questions of
federal law but also questions of provincial law, a power that may
enable the court to resolve through statutory interpretation otherwise difficult constitutional questions.2 °2 Thus, both the range and the nature of
judicial decision-makers are quite different as between these systems.
The United States has far more judges with authority over constitutional
questions than Canada or Germany, and the judges are selected in a
larger variety of ways, yielding a less homogenous lower court judicial
culture.
These differences, some might argue, would support a more categorical approach to freedom of expression issues20 3 - the idea here
being that more formal categorical rules are more likely to be administered with consistency in a large and decentralized system than more
nuanced, "balancing" approaches. 2" Expressive freedoms (of parties to
litigation as well as nonparties) may be thought to be particularly vulnerable to being adversely affected by erroneous decisions of lower court
judges, as is suggested by the concern reflected in some First Amendment cases for the prospect of vague or broadly worded statutes having a
"chilling effect" on constitutionally protected speech. 2 5 Higher courts
cannot always be counted on quickly to correct these errors, and thus,
the reasoning goes, formal, bright line rules that may overprotect speech
are the best practical accommodation to the possibilities of lower court
error.
Although categorical rules may have advantages of administrability
23 (5th ed. 1986) ("Britain and
France ... [select judges by] appointment exclusively at all levels."); but cf T. Leigh Anenson,
For Whom the Bell Tolls... JudicialSelection By Election in Latin America, 4 Sw. J. L. & TRADE
AM. 261 (1997) (noting elections of justices of the peace in some Latin American countries and
arguing in favor of electing judges in Latin America to fight corruption and enhance judicial
legitimacy).
201. This is a point I have discussed over the years with Mark Tushnet, in connection with our
collaboration on a course book and in teaching a course on Comparative Constitutional Law. I am
indebted to him in more ways than I can remember for intellectual challenge and support.
202. See Martha Field, Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 LAW &
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND AND FRANCE

CONTEMP. PROBS.

107, 113-14 (Winter 1992).

203. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the U.S. and Canada, 55
CONTEMP. PROBS.

LAW

&

5 (Winter 1992) (on distinctively categorical U.S. approach).

204. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 538-44 (1988).
205. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972).

20031

HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION

in a large and decentralized court system in which many courts exercise
powers of constitutional review, there remains the question of what the
most appropriate category is. 2 06 In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, the Court's attachment to existing constitutional categories "election" and "speech" outweighed arguments that the category "judge" was
distinct from that of other elected representatives. These differences
(recognized by widespread state practice), 20 7 however, lent considerable
support to restrictions on judicial candidate speech that are more strin-

gent than those of candidates for non-judicial office. If one sees judges
as representatives, they must see themselves as the representatives of all
the people in interpreting the law, including the Constitution.2 °8 All the
people include those protected by rights against discrimination, and

rights of fair criminal process, who may be persistent electoral minorities. Allowing judicial candidates to seek votes by implicit promises to

ignore those rights is inconsistent with that representative role.2 °9 Moreover, as the dissent argued, judges, in performing their central role of
adjudication, are bound by due process norms of impartiality and fairness that do not apply to legislators. 210 A judge in office will predictably
206. The dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota accuses the majority of having adopted a
categorical approach, essentially treating judicial elections like other elections for public office.
See, e.g., 536 U.S. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 536 U.S. at 805-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
But see 536 U.S. at 783 (writing for the Court, Justice Scalia states that, contrary to the dissents of
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, "we neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires
campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office"); but cf id. at 793
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that because the "political speech of candidates is at the heart
of the First Amendment . . . direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are simply
beyond the power of government to impose").
207. See 536 U.S. at 786 (stating that a majority of states now have some provisions governing
judicial candidate speech); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief Justices in
Support of Respondents, Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01521), available at 2002 WL 257559 (noting extensive practices, including resign-to-run-for-otheroffice provisions as well as limitations on speech, developed by states to enable elected judges to
function with the independence and impartiality associated with judging and the demands of due
process).
208. Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 3801, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Surely the
word 'representative' connotes one who is not only elected by the people, but who also, at a
minimum, acts on behalf of the people. Judges do that in a sense - but not in the ordinary sense.
As the captions of the pleadings in some States still display, it is the prosecutor who represents
"the People"; the judge represents the Law - which often requires him to rule against the
People."); HANNA PIT N, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 116-18 (1967) (discussing concept
of a representative as "acting for," in the sense of engaged in the activity of looking after the
interests of a particular group; concluding that if one subscribes to "older jurisprudential doctrine,
that the judge merely discovers and expounds the law," a judge does not "represent" a group; and
suggesting that, rather than "acting for" those who choose the judge, a judge "represents justice,"
which "requires that he be free from other restraints").
209. I do not here address the adequacy of the procedures under the challenged law to
determine the dividing line between permissible and prohibited speech by judicial candidates.
210. 536 U.S. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But cf Hans Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NE. L. REv. 197, 255 (1976).
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face questions of recusal or disqualification if she has spoken on issues

pending before her extra-judicially in campaigning. 21' The line between
general statements of philosophy and more specific statements about
legal issues might thus be understood as an effort to mediate the differ-

ent senses in which a judge could be seen as a representative -

as the

electoral choice of a majority entitled to know something about the
judge's views but also as the representative of the whole polity in assuring fairness to minority interests in adjudicatory decisions.
The Court did not grapple with this question, but rather came close
to adopting a categorical approach in which judicial elections are indis-

tinguishable from elections for representatives or executive office for
purposes of the First Amendment. 2 Reconciling the "due process"
norms of impartiality and fairness of judgment with popular election of

judges is a challenge, for the concepts are in some tension, representing
different modes of what it might mean to be a public, judicial representative.21 3 But the tension simply does not require an all or nothing
211. Popular election of judges may originally have been an effort to have less partisan control
by the political branches over judicial selection, although in recent years it has been understood as
a vehicle for popular influence or control of legal decisions. See Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of
Scholarly Explanationsfor the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 190 (1993) (summarizing literature). Nelson argues that the main motivation for
electing judges was to limit the power of existing governments by removing from executive or
legislative control the power over judges. That is, he argues that it was not originally motivated
by desire to have popular control of legal decisions but rather to avoid unhealthy concentrations of
power in governors or legislators. See id. at 194-96, 203-07. See also Kermit L. Hall, The
Judiciary on Trial: State ConstitutionalReform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-60, 45
HISTORIAN 337, 343 (1983) (concluding that politically moderate lawyers controlled move in the
ante-bellum period toward elected judiciaries in order to increase the status of the bench and the
independence of judges). For competing views on the benefits of elections for judges, see, e.g.,
Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 61 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 79, 105-06 (1998); Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial
Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (1998); Roy A. Schotland,
Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of
American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985).
212. Although Justice Scalia states that the Court is not going this far, see Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002), the Court's decision was so read by the Eleventh
Circuit in Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (striking down the Georgia
prohibition on false and misleading speech by judicial candidates because prohibition applied
beyond misstatements made with actual malice). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
implications of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), were that the same
standard applied under the First Amendment to determine the validity of restrictions on judicial
candidate's speech as that of candidates for nonjudicial office. Id. at 1320-22. It therefore
adopted the actual malice standard of Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (reversing state
invalidation of election where candidate innocently but incorrectly stated that he would take a
lower salary than that required by law).
213. While there may be plausible arguments for popular voting for judges in terms of
allowing people to choose a "Burke-ian" kind of "representative" in applying the law, arguments
for allowing popular election of judges that treat judges as equivalent to representatives in a more
"instructional" sense are troubling insofar as they further elide distinctions between everyday law
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choice, between being "in" First Amendment protections if the activity
is described as an election and "outside" if the activity is described as
choosing a judge. What is mysterious is the way in which the categories
"election" and "speech" had such power for the majority in this case,
while the category of "judge" did not.
Why the state's asserted interest in avoiding constitutional and role
difficulties for elected judges arising out of campaign speech was not
2 14
understood as compellingly in play here is somewhat mysterious.
Perhaps the case is another example of the power (could we say, the
tyranny?) of the "firstness" of the First Amendment. But perhaps the
majority's view also relates to a decline in a belief in the special function of judges. Consider here Judith Resnik's work emphasizing dramatic shifts in the (self) conception of federal judges.2 15 If the federal
judiciary now sees itself as more corporate in character,21 6 and more
administrative in function, does this contribute to a willingness generally
to deny that the category "judge" has real distinctiveness from other cat21 7
egories of "public representatives?
This decision seems like a step in the wrong direction, or a missed
opportunity for more nuanced development of more appropriate categories. Indeed, the Court's willingness to allow the further politicization
of state judiciaries may undermine in the long run the ability of all
courts - including the Supreme Court - to perform with the requisite
21 8
degrees of independence and impartiality, actual and perceived.
While there may be more reasons for clear categorical lines in the
United States because of its size and diversity at the judicial implementation stage, more contextualized analysis (perhaps benefiting from considering other nations' approaches to proportionality), sensitive to the
special role of courts in a constitutional democracy, can assist in definand politics in ways that can depreciate the rule of law as a reliable and impartial form of justice.
For different conceptions of the role of a representative, see generally PITKIN, supra note 208.
214. Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 775-83.
215. Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HAv. L. REv. 374 (1982); Judith Resnik, Trial as
Error,Jurisdictionas Inquiry: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111,
113 HARv. L. REv. 924
(2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]; cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984) (cautioning against move from adjudication to settlement)
216. See Resnik, Trial as Error,supra note 215, at 959-67 (describing and critiquing increased
tendency of federal judges to speak, publicly, in a collective bureaucratic voice).
217. Cf Richard Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election
Deadlock and Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 60 (defending Bush v. Gore decision as
"rough justice," and possibly also "legal justice").
218. Query, though, whether the decision might be understood as reinforcing the distinctive
and hierarchically superior status of the federal Article IIIjudiciary, by making it more difficult
for the elected state court judiciaries to maintain modicums of the kind of appearance of
impartiality and dignity that the federal courts expect for and of their own members.
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ing what the appropriate categories are.219
V.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

In both Canada and Germany, there are some forms of speech constitutionally protected in the United States that can be constitutionally
proscribed. 220 Although it may be argued that proscriptions or limitations on speech must be understood in light of longstanding socio-legal
commitments to a vision of human dignity that is less tolerant than that
in the United States of offense and insult, 22 ' if the question is whether
strong and competitive democracies with robust speech and counterspeech can coexist with the proscription of limited forms of speech
based on its content, the answer from comparative constitutional analysis is yes. In many countries with strong traditions of democracy and
protection of political and civil liberties, the government may punish
some forms of hate-motivated speech. Indeed, in the U.S. tradition
some such speech was proscribable into the 1950s. So the claim that it
would be wholly inconsistent with U.S. constitutional commitments to
reach a different result on the proscribability of hate speech is one that
requires a response that goes beyond mere invocation of U.S. doctrine
prohibiting content-based or viewpoint-based regulation of speech. At
the same time, however, the U.S. free speech tradition is our constitutional tradition, and departures of too great a distance are not only
unlikely but may tear at the pattern in ways that could have undesirable
and perhaps unforeseeable effects.2 22
219. There are important institutional differences between the Supreme Court and the lower
courts that might permit the Supreme Court to employ balancing, or proportionality analysis, in
crafting categorical rules to be applied by lower courts. This Essay is already too long for such an
analysis, but I briefly suggest that it would entail a weighing of the competing values of assuring
information to a public in an election while preserving the judges' abilities (and the perception of
their abilities) to decide cases fairly. See also supra note 172.
220. See Roger Errarra, The Freedom of the Press: The United States, France and Other
European Countries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CoNsTrrrioN ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J Rosenthal eds., 1990).
221. For a distinctive perspective, see Whitman, supra note 105, at 1285-86, 1313-32
(discussing how honor culture in Germany is rooted in a "tradition of social hierarchy," yielding
modem laws not necessarily desirable or possible in the United States).
222. For example, German jurisprudence on the duty to provide for diversity in broadcasting
appears to be fairly far removed from where U.S. law currently is. See KOMMERS, supra note 94,
at 405 (translating Television Case of 1961 to say that article 5 of the Basic Law would permit a
private broadcasting station if, inter alia, "its organization, like that of a public broadcasting
company, offered sufficient assurance that all socially relevant interests would have the
opportunity to express themselves"). The Fairness Doctrine, upheld in Red Lion BroadcastingCo.
v. FCC,395 U.S. 367 (1969) insofar as FCC regulations required radio stations to provide "free
reply time" to persons who were politically attacked, more generally required coverage of
"controversial issues" from "balanced perspectives," and was repealed in 1987 by the FCC. See
Thomas W. Hazlitt, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction
Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation
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In considering adjustments at the margins of U.S. constitutional
law, the Court might benefit from considering the more contextualized
approaches of other Western democracies within the established doctrinal categories in which the Court works. The power of categorical
approaches does not require that each categorical presumption be followed where sufficient countervailing considerations are present, where
the context differs sufficiently. Important pieces of constitutional context, I have tried to argue, include the new commitment to human equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent
amendments to the Constitution - norms that can enter into the First
Amendment conversation without overwhelming its basic commitments
to a substantial sphere of unfettered liberty of expression.
Fiss, in the closing paragraph of Irony of Free Speech, called for
"an improved sense of proportion," one that recognizes that "the state
can be both an enemy and a friend of speech."22' 3 That sense of proportion informs both Canadian and German jurisprudence. The United
States provides a very different institutional and historic setting in which
freedom of speech issues arise, but one in which we may nonetheless be
able to learn something from constitutional interpreters elsewhere.

Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TEC. 335, 365 n.107 (2001). See also Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 72
(treating Red Lion's "endorsement of state power" as a "stray, living at the margins of the law").
223. Fiss, Irony, supra note 8, at 83. U.S. constitutional skepticism about the courts' ability to
distinguish the state as friend from the state as enemy pervades not only First Amendment law but
also equal protection law. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (rejecting
argument that the government's benign uses of race should be reviewed under less stringent
standard of review than invidious uses in part because of difficulty of distinguishing one from the

other).

